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SPECIALIZED TRIAL COURTS IN PATENT
LITIGATION: A REVIEW OF THE PATENT
PILOT PROGRAM’S IMPACT ON
APPELLATE REVERSAL RATES AT THE
FIVE-YEAR MARK
AMY SEMET*
Abstract: Do specialized trial court judges make more accurate decisions in
patent law cases? In 2011, Congress passed a law setting up a ten-year pilot
program to enhance expertise in patent litigation by funneling more trial court
decisions to fourteen select district courts. Now that the five-year mark has
passed, has the program had its intended effect of increasing accuracy, as
measured by less reversal of pilot judges by the Federal Circuit? This Article
analyzes trial court patent cases filed from September 2011 through September 2016, focusing specifically on whether the appellate treatment of cases
heard by district court judges participating in the pilot program differs from
the treatment of cases heard by non-pilot judges. Of the several hundred cases
where the Federal Circuit rules on the substantive patent law issues on appeal,
the results indicate that, even controlling for other factors, the Federal Circuit
does not overrule non-pilot judges more than pilot judges. After discussing the
empirical results, the Article proposes suggestions for reform.

INTRODUCTION
Patent law stands out as an obscure area of law, raising questions about
the capabilities of generalist judges and lay juries to accurately resolve patent disputes.1 Although such cases comprise less than 1% of the overall
© 2019, Amy Semet. All rights reserved.
* Postdoctoral Research Associate, Center for the Study of Democratic Politics, Princeton
University. I would like to thank participants at the 2017 PATCON conference at Northwestern
Pritzker School of Law for their helpful comments on this Article, particularly Christopher Seaman, who served as a discussant, and David Schwartz, who offered helpful comments. I would
also like to thank Vasundhara Prasad, Lauren Koster, and Lauren Allen at Boston College Law
Review for their work on this Article. This Article was cited by Colleen Chien in the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet hearing on the Supreme Court’s T.C. Heartland, LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brand LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 (2017). Hearing on the Supreme Court’s TC Heartland Decision Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the
Internet of the H. Judiciary Comm., 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Colleen Chien, Professor,
Santa Clara University School of Law).
1
Lawrence M. Sung, Strangers in a Strange Land: Specialized Courts Resolving Patent Disputes, 17 BUS. L. TODAY, Mar./Apr. 2008, at 27, 27; see Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball,
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federal docket, the technical complexity of patent cases results in trial judges spending a disproportionate amount of time learning the law as well as
mastering the technology of the patent.2 Scholars have increasingly tried to
analyze statistically whether judges with more experience differ in the way
they decide patent cases.3 After years of debate, the U.S. Congress passed a
law in 2011 establishing a pilot program to leverage federal judge expertise
in patent law cases.4 The new system assumes that judges with more experience will make better decisions and will adjudicate cases faster while facing
shorter learning curves.5 Volunteers for the program, which is scheduled to
run ten years, were selected from the fifteen judicial district courts that
heard the greatest number of patent cases in 2010.6
This Article examines the workings of the program at the halfway
mark to test the pilot program’s success and to gauge whether specialized
patent judges render more correct decisions that are less likely to be disturbed on appeal. Part I details the terminology of patent law and explains
how patent litigation unfolds in the court system.7 Patent litigation is
unique, because appeals are heard by a specialized appellate court in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) stationed in Washington, D.C.8 Over the years, certain trial courts have emerged as de facto
specialized courts, hearing more patent cases than their sister district
courts.9 Part II dissects the empirical findings of earlier research on the in-

Judicial Experience and the Efficiency and Accuracy of Patent Adjudication; An Empirical Analysis of the Case for a Specialized Patent Trial Court, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393, 394–95 & 395
n.1 (2011) (citing Sung, supra).
2
153 CONG. REC. 3713 (2007); see Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 408 (discussing the impact
of specialization on court efficiency).
3
See generally Kesan & Ball, supra note 1 (setting forth an empirical study on judicial experience and specialization).
4
Act of Jan. 4, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat. 3674 (2011); see, e.g., Kesan & Ball,
supra note 1, at 395–96 (outlining the debate surrounding a specialized patent trial court).
5
See 153 CONG. REC. 3714 (2007) (documenting remarks by Representative Howard Coble
on the need for judicial experience in patent law cases).
6
Act of Jan. 4, 2011 § 1(b)(2)(A)(i), (c), 124 Stat. at 3675.
7
See infra notes 19–98 and accompanying text.
8
See John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of Two
Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 555 (2010) (describing creation of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”)).
9
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-490, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENT
OFFICE SHOULD DEFINE QUALITY, REASSESS INCENTIVES, AND IMPROVE CLARITY 16 (2016)
[hereinafter U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.] (noting that the Eastern District of Texas experienced an increase in patent infringement suits). For instance, in 2015, the Eastern District of Texas
heard about 50% of cases involving defendants in patent infringement cases. See id. at 16, 17
fig.3. The District of Delaware is the second most popular district in which to bring a patent infringement suit. See id. at 17 fig.3 (representing graphically the counts of defendants in patent
infringement cases from 2007–2015).
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ner-workings of specialized patent courts.10 Then, Part III discusses the present empirical project, describing the data, the data collection, and the
summary findings.11 Next, Part IV undertakes a statistical analysis to test
the hypothesis of whether judges designated as pilot judges perform “better” compared to non-designated judges as measured by their respective
CAFC reversal rates.12 In particular, this Part discusses the significant
methodological difficulties in undertaking the present analysis, including a
discussion of the selection effects that urge caution in stating definitive
findings on the workings of the pilot program.13 Finally, Part V deciphers
the results and offers proposals for reform of the current system.14
Overall, the empirical analysis presented here indicates that, thus far,
the pilot program has not resulted in pilot judges being reversed less often
on appeal after accounting for other factors. The results indicate that judicial experience influences reversal rates but in an unexpected way. While
participation in the pilot does not affect reversal rates, judges who previously sat by designation at the CAFC were less likely to get reversed on appeal
in certain instances, suggesting that past experience has some impact on
outcomes. Pilot judges fare no better than non-pilot judges, even when controlling for legal issues addressed, procedural posture, and experience,
among other variables.15 But, cases are not necessarily decided the same
way in pilot and non-pilot districts. Rather, pilot judges—who often have
more patent-law experience than non-pilot judges—are somewhat better at
encouraging settlement, though these differences vary based on technology,
issue, and procedural posture.16
The results of this study call into question whether alternatives, in addition to the pilot program, are necessary to increase certainty and efficiency in patent litigation. The shift in recent years to allow for inter partes review of patents—a procedure through which parties can challenge the validity of a patent before administrative judges at the Patent and Trademark Appeals Board (“PTAB”) at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”)—may be a good first step in giving more power to the
USPTO.17 Unlike many other areas of law, courts—even specialized
courts—may not have the resources or technical know-all to engage effec10

See infra notes 99–161 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 162–221 and accompanying text.
12
See infra notes 222–300 and accompanying text.
13
See infra notes 275–300 and accompanying text.
14
See infra notes 301–391 and accompanying text.
15
See infra notes 231–300 and accompanying text.
16
See Mark A. Lemley et al., Does Familiarity Breed Contempt Among Judges Deciding
Patent Cases?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1121, 1151 (2014) (finding “that judges with more patent experience are less likely to rule for patentees on infringement, though not on validity”).
17
See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2018) (establishing who may request review and how).
11
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tively in making patent policy and devising rules that balance property
rights and innovation. Although specialized patent trial courts may be a
needed first step in reform, the time is ripe to start thinking about whether
the patent system needs to be re-altered fundamentally to give greater rulemaking authority and responsibility back to the USPTO or some other expert administrative agency.18
I. PATENT LAW SPECIALIZATION
A. Basics of Patent Law
Patents confer a right on patentees to prevent others from “making, using, . . . or selling” the patented invention in question.19 To determine patent
rights, adjudicators engage in a process called claim construction in which a
judge determines the meaning of the patent’s terms as defined by the patent’s claims.20 For example, one claim among the hundreds of patents and
patent applications covering the Apple iPhone (in its past, current, or future
forms) states that “[a]n electronic device may have a flexible portion that
allows the device to be folded.”21
When constructing claims, courts first interpret the intrinsic evidence
of the patent, which includes the language of the claims; the specification of
the patent, encompassing the written description of the claimed invention
and the disclosure of the preferred embodiment; and, the patent’s prosecution history, including written correspondence between the patentees or the
patentees’ lawyers with the USPTO during the patent prosecution process.22
If the intrinsic evidence is unclear, courts may then consider extrinsic evidence, such as dictionary definitions, treatises, expert testimony, or other
evidence that the court believes relevant to the job of interpreting the
claims.23 Trial courts review patent claims as a matter of law.24 Appeals
courts review claim constructions de novo but subsidiary factual questions

18
See, e.g., Lauren Cohen et al., “Troll” Check? A Proposal for Administrative Review of
Patent Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1775, 1775, 1782 (2017) (arguing for automatic administrative review at the onset of a patent litigation amid calls for reform of the system).
19
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2018) (describing patentee’s right to exclude); id. § 271(a) (listing actions that constitute patent infringement). Cohen et al. explore the basics of patent law and
its accompanying proceeds in their 2017 article. See Cohen et al., supra note 18, at 1783–90.
20
Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
21
See U.S. Patent No. 20,170,336,831, at [54], [57], [71] (filed Sept. 22, 2016) (listing Apple,
Inc. as the applicant and covering “electronic devices with flexible displays”).
22
Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 5 & nn.19–20 (2001).
23
See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 & n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (discussing when the judge may rely upon extrinsic evidence).
24
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
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for clear error.25 Courts should construe terms by their “plain and ordinary
meaning to one of skill in the art” unless the intrinsic evidence dictates otherwise.26
The Patent Act of 1952 is written broadly, allowing inventors to have
patents on any “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . .”27 Many disputes in patent litigation concern whether
one party infringed another’s patents, and in turn whether those patents are
invalid due to being anticipated or made obvious by the prior inventions of
others, or whether the patents should be rendered unenforceable due to the
patentee’s fraud before the USPTO during prosecution, an allegation known
as inequitable conduct.28 Additionally, patentees can file for a preliminary
injunction to stop further infringement of the patent.29 Such an analysis requires the judge to consider not only the likelihood of success on the merits
but also irreparable harm.30 Motions for preliminary injunctions can quickly
escalate into “mini-trial[s]” involving claim construction as that the judge
must opine on validity and infringement in order to determine the likelihood
of success on the injunction motion.31 In addition to injunctive relief, a patentee who prevails in an infringement action can recover “damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together
with interest and costs as fixed by the court.”32 If patentees prevail on infringement claims, they may also be entitled to treble damages.33
The adjudicatory structure for patent law disputes is unique in American law.34 Regional generalist district courts undertake trials of patent litiga25

Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015).
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2018) (requiring “a written description of the invention” detailed
enough “to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same”); see also Moore, supra note 22, at 6 (discussing conventions of claim interpretation).
27
Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
28
Id. §§ 271(a), 282; see id. §§ 102–103 (describing the “conditions for patentability” and
potential invalidity); John M. Golden, Patent Law’s Falstaff: Inequitable Conduct, the Federal
Circuit, and Therasense, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 353, 354 (2012) (defining the defense of
inequitable conduct). Defenses, such as inequitable conduct, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011).
29
Adam Shartzer, Patent Litigation 101: Empirical Support for the Patent Pilot Program’s
Solution to Increase Judicial Experience in Patent Law, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 191, 221 (2009); see 35
U.S.C. § 283 (2018) (establishing the boundaries of injunctions).
30
Shartzer, supra note 29, at 221 & nn.271–72.
31
Id. at 221–22.
32
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018).
33
See id. (providing judges with discretion).
34
Banks Miller & Brett Curry, Expertise, Experience, and Ideology on Specialized Courts:
The Case of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 839, 841–42
(2009).
26
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tion, but appellate jurisdiction rests in the specialized CAFC in Washington,
D.C.35 In 1982, the appellate dockets of the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the U.S. Court of Claims combined to form the CAFC,
which has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of patent disputes.36 The impetus behind the CAFC’s formation was to ensure uniform application of
the nation’s patent laws since regional appellate courts greatly differed in
how they ruled in patent cases, causing alarm in the business community for
the unpredictability of patent rulings.37 Of particular concern was the negative impact on economic and industrial growth stemming from “inconsistencies in judge-made patent law.”38 Today, one-third of the CAFC’s docket
concerns patent law cases, taking up a disproportionate share of the court’s
time relative to other cases due to the complexity posed by patent disputes.39 This complexity stems not only from the technical sophistication of
the cases, but also from the increased interrelation with other areas of law
that touch on patent issues, such as antitrust law.40 Indeed, the Federal Judicial Center (“FJC”) notes the burden that patent litigation imposes on courts
due to its complexity and cost, placing it fourth in terms of time burden,
behind only death penalty habeas cases, environmental cases, and civil cases under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.41
Scholars offer differing opinions on whether the CAFC has achieved
its goals of fostering uniformity and discouraging forum shopping.42 Judge
35

See Golden, supra note 8, at 555 & n.15 (describing the uniqueness of the CAFC).
See Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit—A Reminiscence, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REV.
513, 521 (1992) (detailing the history of the cases now heard by the CAFC).
37
See James B. Gambrell, The Evolving Interplay of Patent Rights and Antitrust Restraints in
the Federal Circuit, 9 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 137, 139 (2001) (describing the purpose of the
legislation creating the CAFC); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1624 (2007) (outlining Congress’s concerns with
regionalism); Newman, supra note 36, at 516 (recalling the impetus for creating a court with specialized patent review). As Judge Pauline Newman wrote, “the fate of duly examined and issued
patents had become so uncertain in the courts as to place a cloud on patent-based investment.”
Newman, supra note 36, at 516.
38
Newman, supra note 36, at 517.
39
See 153 CONG. REC. 3713 (2007) (citing complexity of cases as a reason for the pilot program’s creation); Paul R. Michel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to
Meet the Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1180–81, 1194 (1999) (noting that about
one-third of the CAFC’s docket consists of patent cases but they can take require upwards of ten
times more work than certain other civil cases); see also Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 410 (citing
Michel, supra).
40
See Gambrell, supra note 37, at 139 (noting the “fear” that the CAFC will encroach impermissibly upon antitrust law); Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 410 (citing Gambrell, supra note 37).
41
See PAT LOMBARD & CAROL KRAFKA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 2003–2004 DISTRICT COURT
CASE-WEIGHTING STUDY: FINAL REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL STATISTICS OF
THE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL RESOURCES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 5 tbl.1 (2005) (providing data on “case weights for civil case types”).
42
See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Empirical Analysis of the Patent
Court, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 112 (2004) (noting that the CAFC had a “positive and significant
36
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Kimberly A. Moore, who was later appointed to the CAFC, concluded that
forum shopping is a continuing problem within the top ten district court
jurisdictions that heard almost half of all patent cases between 1995 and
1999.43 In particular, she found that litigants chose districts based on favorable procedural or substantive law.44 Other scholars complain that the
CAFC does not accurately transmit precedent for lower courts to follow
because it does not always make the full reasoning of its opinions known.45
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss offers a more positive assessment of the CAFC,
concluding that it contributes greatly to the “precision and accuracy of patent law.”46
Some scholars also argue that decision making at the trial court level
changed after the CAFC’s formation.47 Using data from 1989 to 1996, John
R. Allison and Mark A. Lemley concluded that decisions on validity favorable to patentees is slightly higher after the CAFC came into being.48 Glynn
S. Lunney’s study echoes these results; he found that the percent of patents
held invalid decreased from 50% before the CAFC’s formation to about
25% in the period 1994–1995.49 Scott E. Atkinson et al. also examined the

impact on the number of patent applications, the number of patents issued, the success rate of
patent applications, the amount of patent litigation, and, possibly, the level of research and development expenditures”); Richard Linn, The Future Role of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit Now That It Has Turned 21, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 731, 732 (2004) (arguing that
the CAFC helped achieve uniformity, certainty, and clarity within patent law); Nard & Duffy,
supra note 37, at 1620–21 (arguing that the CAFC is constrained by its own “isolated and sterile
jurisprudence”); Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 543, 545 (2003) (“By most accounts, the [legislation that created
the CAFC] seems to have achieved its purposes. The [CAFC] has clarified many aspects of patent
law and made it more coherent as a whole.”).
43
See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect
Innovation?, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y, 558, 571 (2001) (analyzing “whether patent
cases are equally dispersed”).
44
Id. at 574–85.
45
See, e.g., Erica U. Bodwell, Note, Published and Unpublished Federal Circuit Patent Decisions: A Comparison, 30 IDEA 233, 233, 235 (1990) (noting that the CAFC often does not publish its decision when it affirms the district court); Michel, supra note 39, at 1186–87 (criticizing
the lack of precedential value of a substantial portion of the CAFC’s cases).
46
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1989).
47
See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent
Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. L. REV. 745, 754 (2000) (finding a slight increase in validity findings
post-CAFC creation); Scott E. Atkinson et al., The Economics of a Centralized Judiciary: Uniformity, Forum Shopping and the Federal Circuit, 52 J.L. & ECON. 411, 412 (2009) (finding a
decrease in non-uniformity in the post-CAFC universe of cases); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., EObviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363, 371–72, 371 fig.1 (2001) (finding an
overall decrease in the rate of patent invalidity after the implementation of the CAFC).
48
Allison & Lemley, supra note 47, at 754.
49
Lunney, Jr., supra note 47, at 371–72, 371 fig.1.
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rate at which trial courts mark patents not invalid and found less variability
across districts after the creation of the CAFC.50
B. Call for More Expertise
Beginning in the 1990s, scholars shifted attention to explore whether
the CAFC’s experiment of specialized decision making should be translated
to the lower trial courts with the twin aims of bringing uniformity to patent
law and encouraging greater innovation and growth by protecting patent
rights.51 Despite the CAFC’s emergence, problems remained with the system. In particular, compared to other areas of law where only 10% of cases
are appealed, litigants appeal half (50%) of patent cases to the CAFC.52 One
predominant concern is the high rate at which the CAFC reverses lower
court decisions, particularly on claim construction—one of the most important areas in patent law.53 Scholars also express skepticism that lay juries
can reliably decide patent cases.54 As Judge Moore uncovered, patent juries
are more likely than district court judges to find for the alleged infringer in
deciding infringement, validity, and damages cases, though the different
outcomes between jury and bench trials are less apparent than expected.55
Further, juries tend to decide cases on an “all-or-nothing basis” compared to
50

Atkinson et al., supra note 47, at 412.
See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377,
411–12 (considering whether specialization is more effective at the trial court level than in the
appellate courts); Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 395 (discussing proposals for specialization
throughout the patent law system); Michel, supra note 39, at 1191–92 (describing the structural
pitfalls that exist between the district courts and the CAFC); John B. Pegram, Should There Be a
U.S. Trial Court with a Specialization in Patent Litigation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 765, 775 (2000) [hereinafter Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court?] (arguing for
specialization akin to the British system to support innovation); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers
for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 67, 112–13 (1995) (advocating for trial court specialization). See generally 153 CONG. REC. 3713 (discussing the aims of the pilot program in the district
courts).
52
Michel, supra note 39, at 1193.
53
See, e.g., id. at 1191–92, 1195–96 (offering multi-faceted criticisms of the current system);
David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade Commission, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1701 (2009) [hereinafter Schwartz, Courting Specialization] (describing responses to the high reversal rate).
54
See, e.g., Moore, supra note 22, at 3 & nn.5–6 (comparing the shortcomings of judges and
juries in patent law cases); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries and Patent Cases—An Empirical
Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 408–09 (2000) (comparing outcomes of cases
decided by judges and juries); Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on
Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 879–80 (2002) (addressing benefits of specialized juries).
55
Moore, supra note 54, at 408. Judge Moore found no difference with respect to enforceability findings and discovered that there were no statistically significant differences between judges
and lay juries on appeal. Id. at 408–09. The latter finding, she notes, however, could be due to the
deferential standard of appellate review. Id. at 409.
51
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judges, who may decide each issue separately, ruling for both the patentee
and the competitor.56
Concerns about accuracy became especially acute after the United
States Supreme Court decision in 1996 in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., the seminal case in which the Court ruled that trial courts must
review the patent claims as a matter of law and appellate courts must apply
a de novo standard of review on appeal.57 In a “Markman hearing,” judges
decide the scope of the claims at issue, hearing from experts and the parties
on how narrow or wide a given claim should be interpreted.58 How the
claims are construed forms the basis for any subsequent infringement or
validity analysis.59 Indeed, in some cases, the parties even stipulate to infringement or non-infringement on the basis of the claim construction, thus
underscoring how important this pre-trial proceeding is to the case outcome
in patent cases.60
Scholars find varying evidence that district courts reliably construe patent claims.61 Because district courts receive no deference on their claim
constructions, there is some level of unpredictability.62 Analyzing cases
from 1996 to 2000, during the first years of Markman hearings in district
courts, Judge Moore found that district courts interpret the claims wrongly
33% of the time, resulting in cases being either vacated or reversed 81% of
the time.63 This high rate of reversal contrasts with the 10% rate of reversal
in non-patent law appeals.64 Similarly, in his study of the slightly later period between 1998 and 2000, Christian A. Chu discovered that almost a majority (44%) of claim constructions were modified on appeal.65 David L.
Schwartz’s 2008 study also found that about 40% of cases included a claim
56

See id. at 409 (summarizing the differences in decisions rendered by juries and judges).
See 517 U.S. at 372, 390, 391 (assigning claim construction to the court and framing the
role of the CAFC in reviewing those decisions); see also Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138
F.3d 1448, 1451, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (inferring that de novo review is the proper standard based
on the Supreme Court’s preservation of the CAFC’s appellate decision in Markman).
58
See Andrew T. Zindel, Comment, Patent Claim Construction in the Trial Courts: A Study
Showing the Need for Clear Guidance from the Federal Circuit, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 711, 712
& nn.6–7 (2003) (describing the Markman hearing).
59
Id. at 712.
60
See id. at 728–29, 729 n.150 (considering the impact of Markman hearings on litigation
decisions).
61
See, e.g., Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001) (analyzing reversal rates over time); Moore,
supra note 22, at 3 (noting high error rate); Zindel, supra note 58, at 713 (noting persistently high
reversal rate).
62
Moore, supra note 22, at 27–28.
63
Id. at 2.
64
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., PILOT PROGRAMS FOR PATENT JUDGES, H.R. REP. NO.
109-673, at 5 (2006).
65
Chu, supra note 61, at 1104.
57
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construction that was wrong, at least in part.66 As Jay P. Kesan and Gwendolyn G. Ball argue, combined with the fact that claim construction decisions are reviewed de novo on appeal, this “high rate of both claim construction modifications and claim construction-based reversals in CAFC
decisions may be unraveling many of the gains in predictability and uniformity resulting from the creation of the CAFC.”67 Although some scholars
contend that claim construction is no different than other issues in inspiring
difference, the high rate of reversal on claim construction calls into question
whether specialized expertise can create greater predictability and accuracy.68
C. De Facto Specialization in Trial Courts
Even prior to the onset of the pilot program, district courts have de facto specialized in the years since the emergence of the CAFC.69 In her study
of close to ten thousand cases terminated between 1995 and 1999, Judge
Moore found that patent litigation is geographically concentrated, with the
top five districts accounting for almost a third of patent cases, with the next
five districts accounting for an additional 15% of the total.70 A later study
confirmed these results.71 In an analysis of trial courts’ decisions from 1995
through 2003, Kesan and Ball uncovered that the top ten district courts
heard over half of all the nations’ patent law cases, and that the following
ten district courts heard almost another third.72 The rest of the districts, al-

66
David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction
Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 248 (2008) [hereinafter Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?].
67
Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 416; see also Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d. at 1451 (providing the
scope of de novo review); Chu, supra note 61, at 1143 (recognizing “an increase in claim construction modifications and claim interpretation-based reversals since Cybor Corp.”). These differences in claim construction may be compounded by the fact that the CAFC does not speak in a
single voice on claim construction. See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105,
1111–12 (2004) (arguing that the CAFC is divided into “two distinct methodological approaches”
for interpreting claims).
68
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminacy, and Interpretation at the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J., 1025, 1092, 1094 (2007) (arguing that “claim
construction has been no less determinate than another interpretive regime, that of contract interpretation” but also considering the positive impact of specialization at the district court level).
69
See Moore, supra note 43, at 561 (noting that specialization occurs due to the forum selection choices made by litigants).
70
Id. at 571.
71
See Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 421–23, 421 n.175 (discussing results of their study).
72
See id. at 421.
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most 80%, heard only 20% of patent cases filed.73 Likewise, a select group
of judges ruled on most patent cases, with the top 20% of judges hearing
almost two-thirds of all patent cases in the United States and 40% of judges
hearing only one patent case over the entire eight-year period.74 Yet, despite
the high concentration of cases before only a few judges, Kesan and Ball
found that among the judges who heard 80% of the patent cases in the entire
period under study, they each heard, on average, only eleven cases.75 In
turn, judges with fewer than twenty cases on their docket oversaw slightly
less than a majority (40%) of cases, with 16% of the cases being heard by
judges with fewer than ten total patent cases.76
Litigants favor certain districts for their reputation and efficiency.77
Notably, in recent years patentees alleging infringement are filing cases
with increasing frequency in the Eastern District of Texas.78 The forum is
perceived as having plaintiff-friendly rules and pro-patentee juries, which
resulted in patentee win rates of 90% in jury trials between 1998 and 2006
compared to the national average of 68%.79 Some believe that Texas juries
view property rights differently while also having “a great respect for the
government and a general distrust of large corporations.”80 Local rules in
Texas also shorten the discovery period to nine months, making it quicker to
resolve cases.81 Moreover, judges strictly enforce deadlines and rarely grant
extensions in an attempt to “clear the docket.”82
Indeed, some scholars argue that judicial practice in the Eastern District of Texas has “institutionalized” a pro-patentee bias.83 Dan Klerman and
73

Id. The districts comprising the top third of cases adjusted each year as some districts
moved in and out of the top groups. Id. For example, the Eastern District of Virginia made the top
ten in two years between 1995 and 2003 but not in the others. Id. at 421 n.175.
74
Id. at 422.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 423. By contrast, CAFC judges review about forty patent cases per year. Id.
77
See, e.g., Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the
Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9
YALE J.L. & TECH. 193, 206, 209–10 (2007) (describing the reputational value and efficiency of
the Eastern District of Texas that has made it popular with patentees).
78
Id. at 205 (finding that the number of cases in the Eastern District of Texas doubled between 2004–2006).
79
Id. at 206, 210–11. Additionally, the Eastern District of Texas hears few criminal cases,
clearing the way for patent cases to have greater priority. Id. at 209. Moreover, changes in Texas
law limited damages in malpractice cases, resulting in a proportionate decline in medical malpractice cases being filed in Texas federal trial courts and thus easing congestion in the courts. Id. at
209–10.
80
Id. at 213 & nn.91–94.
81
Id. at 209.
82
Id.
83
See, e.g., Dan Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 243, 253 &
nn.47–48 (2016) (describing institutional practices of the Eastern District of Texas that result in a
favorable outcome for patentees).
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Greg Reilly argue that judges in the Eastern District of Texas actually have
affirmatively targeted patentee-plaintiffs to file more cases by “distort[ing]”
common rules concerning how cases are assigned, joined or transferred,
how discovery is conducted, and the standards for summary judgment.84 For
instance, judges in the Eastern District of Texas rarely grant summary
judgment motions, thus placing more cases before patentee-friendly juries.85
Finding patents invalid is also rare; it took eighteen years before the first
jury in the Eastern District of Texas found a patent claim invalid.86 The factors that make the Eastern District of Texas attractive to patentees, however,
also make it attractive to “patent trolls,” which are holding companies that
do not practice the invention themselves and that are set up primarily to license patents.87 Cases filed by these non-practicing entities (“NPEs”) are
more common than ever, particularly in the Eastern District of Texas.88
Additionally, district courts have self-segregated and developed different reputations for speed and expertise in certain technologies.89 Some district courts, such as the Eastern District of Texas and the Northern District
of California, have local rules that are designed to allow for “more efficient” management of patent cases.90 The Eastern District of Virginia is
commonly referred to as the “rocket docket” due to its reputation for speediness.91 Trials are more common in the District of Delaware, where nearly a
quarter of patent cases proceed to trial.92 By contrast, cases filed in the Central and Northern Districts of California tend to have earlier resolutions.93
District courts also have developed de facto reputations for expertise in certain fields.94 Many pharmaceutical cases are filed in the District of New Jer84

Id. at 243.
See id. at 251, 252 & tbl.2 (comparing the rate of summary judgment in prolific patent
districts and the impact of summary judgment on case outcomes). Additionally, judges in the
Eastern District of Texas avoid granting transfer motions, thus contributing to an environment
where defendants may be forced to settle. Id. at 260–61, 262–63.
86
See Leychkis, supra note 77, at 211.
87
Id. at 213, 214.
88
See id. (“The combination of the local juries’ respect for personal property rights and government agencies and their distrust of large corporate defendants makes the Eastern District of
Texas an ideal venue for ‘patent trolls.’”); see also MARGARET S. WILLIAMS ET AL., FED. JUDICIARY CTR., PATENT PILOT PROGRAM: FIVE-YEAR REPORT 29 (2016), https://www.fjc.gov/content/
316142/patent-pilot-program-five-year-report [https://perma.cc/W7BZ-5WGA] (defining non-practicing entities (“NPE”)).
89
See, e.g., Leychkis, supra note 77, at 209 (describing the efficiency of certain districts’ rule
regimes).
90
Id.
91
Id. at 210.
92
Id. at 202; Moore, supra note 43, at 578 tbl.5.
93
Leychkis, supra note 77, at 203; Moore, supra note 43, at 578 tbl.5.
94
See, e.g., WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 88, at 9 n.14 (describing trends in the District of
New Jersey); Moore, supra note 43, at 572 (hypothesizing trends in the Northern District of California).
85
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sey, which is home to several of the largest pharmaceutical companies who
often file Abbreviated New Drug Applications.95 Similarly, many computer
and software cases are filed in the Northern District of California, the home
of Silicon Valley.96 These differences have led patentee-win rates to vary
among the districts; although patentees win over two-thirds of the time in
the Northern District of California, they prevail less than half the time in
Delaware and in the Northern District of Illinois.97 The trend toward de facto specialization in the district courts combined with the high rate of reversal at the CAFC are causing alarm among the patent bar.98
II. SCHOLARLY LITERATURE ON SPECIALIZED COURTS
Does the system foster too much opportunity to forum shop? Does the
lack of specialization at the trial court level prevent the CAFC from accomplishing its purpose of setting uniform patent law? This Part addresses these
questions.99
A. Arguments For and Against Specialized Trial Courts
In recent years, advocates of patent reform have increasingly bemoaned the rampant forum shopping in patent law and that patent decisions
are disproportionately appealed relative to other areas of law.100 Across all
appellate courts, civil cases are appealed about 10% of the time, yet in patent law, appeals are filed in nearly 50% of cases.101 An experienced trial
court, some argue, is needed even more than a specialized appellate court as
the former dispose of cases in a more efficient manner and with greater accuracy.102 Because trial courts deal mainly with facts, they can leverage
95

WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 88, at 9 n.14.
See Moore, supra note 43, at 572 (considering influences on the high rate of cases in the
Northern District of California).
97
See Leychkis, supra note 77, at 203 (comparing patentee win rates in various districts).
98
See Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 416 (highlighting concerns with reversal rates); Moore,
supra note 43, at 560 n.5 (considering concerns with forum shopping).
99
See infra notes 100–161 and accompanying text.
100
See, e.g., Klerman & Reilly, supra note 83, at 242 (offering reasons for why forum shopping is harmful to litigation); Michel, supra note 39, at 1193 (comparing appeal rates for federal
civil cases).
101
Michel, supra note 39, at 1193.
102
See id. (discussing the disproportionate rate of appeals of patent cases from the trial courts
compared to the rate of appeals of civil cases); see also Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1446–47, 1472 & n.173 (2010) (arguing for changing venue rules to encourage specialization among district court judges); Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 402–03 (supporting specialization at the trial court level); Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court?, supra
note 51, at 767 (2000) (arguing for specialization in the U.S. Court of International Trade
(“CIT”)); Gregory J. Wallace, Note, Toward Certainty and Uniformity in Patent Infringement
Cases After Festo and Markman: A Proposal for a Specialized Patent Trial Court with a Rule of
96
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their expertise on technical matters to better understand how to apply patent
law.103
As Kesan and Ball contend, there are four arguments as to why courts
may want to specialize: (1) “the development of judicial human capital;”
(2) to foster uniformity and consistent precedent; (3) the impact specialization has on the “political economy of the legal system”; and (4) to increase
the efficiency of the trial courts.104 The argument for court specialization is
especially strong with respect to complex matters like patent litigation.105
As Dreyfuss notes, “[t]he more intricate the law, the more likely it is that a
generalist will get things wrong, confuse matters, and encourage additional
litigation.”106 Specialist courts are likely better able to gauge the nuances
behind bright line rules.107 They may also, by extension, devise precedent
that is uniform and consistent across time and fact patterns.108 The need for
a specialized forum is especially felt when the cases address a subject matter of national concern, the Supreme Court rarely provides oversight, and
the availability of forum shopping encourages “parties [to] game the system”—all attributes of the modern patent system.109 Moreover, specialized
judges might act less ideologically and be less inclined to rule in line with
“ideological fads” than non-specialized judges.110 Specialized judges decide
cases faster as they do not need to take the time to get up to speed with arcane areas of law.111 Specialization can also combat forum shopping by encouraging consistency and reducing administrative costs.112

Greater Deference, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1383, 1384 (2004) (proposing reform through specialization of trial courts).
103
See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1476
(2012) (arguing that trial court judges, as opposed to the CAFC judges, can more easily specialize
in the “complexity of the technology underlying” patent law cases); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts
and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035,
1065 (2003) (considering the impact of inaccurate factual determinations by the CAFC); Rai,
supra note 54, at 878–81 (discussing the pitfalls of factual determinations by the CAFC and the
arguments for specialized trial courts).
104
Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 400–01.
105
See id. at 414 (supporting trial court specialization).
106
Dreyfuss, supra note 51, at 409.
107
Id. at 378.
108
See id. (encouraging specialization to create “single voice” and “[g]reater consistency in
court opinions”); Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 402 (“A specialized court that allows judges to
gain an in-depth understanding of existing law may promote uniformity and predictability across
jurisdictions . . . .”).
109
Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 403–04.
110
See Stempel, supra note 51, at 104 (describing the ideological influences that plague generalist judges).
111
Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 408.
112
Id. at 408; see also Charles W. Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:
More Than a National Patent Court, 49 MO. L. REV. 43, 46 (1984) (discussing similar benefits of
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Specialized trial courts have their disadvantages.113 Generalist judges
may be more adept at linking patent law with other legal quagmires.114 Most
of the judges on the CAFC, a specialized court with limited jurisdiction, do
not have science backgrounds.115 So “many distinguished opinions” in patent law have been written by generalist appellate judges—some with minimal technical training or experience in patent law.116 Further, like most civil cases, many patent cases concern routine procedural matters, like jurisdiction or standing, or concern areas of law like contract interpretation, antitrust, libel, or state-law trade secret claims—issues on which a specialized
patent trial court offers no special insight.117 In turn, the lack of diversity of
cases in specialized courts could lead to “tunnel vision,” stagnating the development of precedent consistent with changing times.118 Specialized
judges, especially those located within administrative agencies, may be subject to capture by the very interest they oversee.119 In particular, a specialized court like the CAFC could be biased toward the federal government
and thus more likely rule that the USPTO committed no error and that the
patent is valid.120 The judicial appointment process for specialized judges
may also be more partisan as special interests clamor to get their favored

specialized appellate courts). The costs of litigation can be lessened with “more efficient administration.” Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 409.
113
Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 409.
114
Lemley et al., supra note 16, at 1123; Sarang Vijay Damle, Note, Specialize the Judge, Not
the Court: A Lesson from the German Constitutional Court, 91 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1281 (2005).
See generally Simon Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized
Judiciary, 37 A.B.A. J. 425 (1951) (arguing strongly, from the perspective of a federal district
judge, against the creation of a specialized patent court).
115
See Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 400 (defining the CAFC); Rai, supra note 103, at 1068
& n.148 (reflecting on the expertise of judges on the CAFC).
116
See Dreyfuss, supra note 46, at 24–25, 25 n.152 (describing the backgrounds of key CAFC
patent law judges).
117
See Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 745, 748 (1981)
(noting the boundary issues raised by specialized courts); Rifkind, supra note 114, at 426 (reflecting on the undesirability of a specialized patent court).
118
See Dreyfuss, supra note 51, at 381 (considering the downsides of a specialized court);
Fromer, supra note 102, at 1472 (reviewing critiques of specialized trial courts).
119
See Lawrence Baum, Specializing the Federal Courts: Neutral Reforms or Efforts to
Shape Judicial Policy?, 74 JUDICATURE 217, 224 (1991) (noting that specialized courts represent
“the efforts of interest groups to secure advantages for themselves”); Richard A. Posner, Will the
Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the
Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 785 (1983) (“Specialists are more likely than generalists to identify with the goals of a government program . . . .”).
120
See Gugliuzza, supra note 103, at 1449, 1466 (discussing drawbacks to specialization and
potential bias); Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 1965, 1970, 1971 (2009) (positing that the USPTO has had increasing influence on the
CAFC as the latter has become more pro-patentee).
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candidate appointed.121 As a result of partisan influences, specialized judges
might be more ideological or less qualified than non-specialists, thus lending less stability to decision making in general.122 Further, specialization
may lead to increased error if appellate courts defer more often to specialized expertise at the trial court level.123 Specialized judges may be less likely to set forth their reasoning in clear, well-reasoned decisions if the universe of judicial decision makers is small and specialized.124
B. Empirical Studies of Specialized Patent Trial Courts
Several scholars have examined whether judicial expertise impacts trial court decision making in patent law by simply analyzing, in a nonstatistical fashion, the appellate courts’ reversal rate of patent decisions to
uncover patterns.125 Donna M. Gitter argued that reversal rates of claim
construction are lower in England than in the United States because England hears cases through a specialized patent tribunal.126 Similarly,
Schwartz looked at how reversals vary depending on judicial experience but
found it of little relevance.127 Specifically, Schwartz contends that claim
construction reversal rates do not decrease with an increase in the number
of cases appealed to the CAFC or with more experience overall in patent

121
Andrew P. Morriss, Comment, A Public Choice Perspective on the Federal Circuit, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 811, 816 (2004) (“[W]e would expect the repeat players concerned with
[specialized issues] to invest in the judicial selection process to gain appointments of candidates
they thought would favor their position.”); see also Posner, supra note 119, at 784 (noting that “an
independent judiciary will tend on balance to reduce the scope of special interest politics in American life and . . . a generalist judiciary will be more independent than a specialist one”).
122
Posner, supra note 119, at 781; see Jordan, supra note 117, at 748 (discussing how specialized federal judgeships can be seen “as inferior” to generalist positions, affecting “the quality of
decisions”); see also Damle, supra note 114, at 1285–86 (citing Jordan, supra note 117).
123
See Lemley et al., supra note 16, at 1128 (discussing concerns with specialized trial courts,
especially in patent law); Moore supra note 22, at 29 (weighing the pros and cons of increased
deference).
124
See Rifkind, supra note 114, at 426 (fearing that a specialized patent law system would
become hyper-exclusive, resulting in “unintelligible” legal doctrine).
125
See, e.g., Donna M. Gitter, Should the United States Designate Specialist Patent Trial
Judges? An Empirical Analysis of H.R. 628 in Light of the English Experience and the Work of
Professor Moore, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 169, 185–86 (2009) (arguing that increasing
the expertise of U.S. district court judges would lower reversal rates at the CAFC based on the
specialized English model); Moore, supra note 22, at 29 (finding reversal rates do not improve
with de novo review of claim construction); Schwartz, Courting Specialization, supra note 53, at
1702 (finding reversal rates are not correlated to judicial experience with patent law cases). See
generally Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 418 (discussing the claim construction-focused studies by
Gitter, supra, Olson, infra note 132, and Schwartz, Courting Specialization, supra note 53).
126
Gitter, supra note 125, at 183, 185–86.
127
Schwartz, Courting Specialization, supra note 53, at 1702; Schwartz, Practice Makes
Perfect?, supra note 66, at 255–56, 255 fig.5.
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litigation or with experience on the bench.128 Indeed, he found that judges
have the highest reversals rate if they had multiple claim construction appeals.129 In his 2009 study, Schwartz analyzed whether specialized judges at
the U.S. International Trade Commission (“USITC”) are less likely to be
reversed on appeal than district court judges.130 He found that administrative law judges at the USITC are not more accurate than generalist judges,
at least in terms of claim construction.131 In another study, Nancy Olson
discerned no difference in claim construction rulings across varying tiers of
judicial experience.132 In her data, Judge Moore also failed to see an increase in affirmance rates over time.133 These studies, however, concern
only one issue on appeal—claim construction—and were never designed to
be robust statistical tests of the impact of judicial specialization on appellate
reversal, partly because these analyses do not control for other variables that
could impact results.134
Other scholars argue that specialization has reduced reversal rates,
though their studies are not designed to cover identical ground as the
aforementioned scholarship and do not employ robust statistical techniques.135 Looking at CAFC cases filed during the two-year period between
1998 and 2000, Christian A. Chu contends that “more active” district courts,
defined as those where the CAFC heard more than ten cases, had lower reversal rates compared to “less active” districts, though his results lack statistical significance and are more descriptive than quantitative.136 His analysis
also omits Federal Circuit Rule 36 (“Rule 36”) opinions on summary affir128

Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?, supra note 66, at 252, 256.
Id. at 252.
130
Schwartz, Courting Specialization, supra note 53, at 1703.
131
Id. at 1704.
132
Nancy Olson, Comment, Does Practice Make Perfect? An Examination of Congress’s
Proposed District Court Patent Pilot Program, 55 UCLA L. REV. 745, 774–75, 779 (2008).
133
Moore, supra note 22, at 29 (“[A]ffirmance rates have not improved substantially over the
five years since Markman.”).
134
Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 418–19.
135
See, e.g., Chu, supra note 61, at 1122–23 (comparing districts based on the number of
patent appeals they send to the CAFC); Shartzer, supra note 29, at 228, 233 (finding greater experience correlates with lower reversal rates).
136
Chu, supra note 61, at 1092, 1122–23. Chu counts among the “more active” districts the
following: the Central District of California, the District of Delaware, the District of Massachusetts, the District of Minnesota, the District of New Jersey, the Eastern District of Michigan, the
Eastern District of Virginia, the Northern District of California, the Northern District of Illinois,
the Southern District of Florida, and the Southern District of New York. Id. at 1122. He also includes appeals from the former Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, the Court of Federal
Claims, and the USITC in the “more active” category. Id. Chu examines cases where the CAFC
expressly reviews the lower tribunal’s claim construction. See id. at 1092, 1100 & n.121 (limiting
the study to written decisions issued by the CAFC on “all patent issues, including infringement,
validity[,] and inequitable conduct” but also analyzing claim construction on its own). He, therefore, excludes Rule 36 judgments. Id. at 1100 n.121.
129
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mances, which biases the results toward showing higher claim construction
reversal rates.137 In analyzing cases preemptively in 2009 to consider
whether Congress’s proposed pilot program would reduce reversals, Adam
Shartzer concluded that when looking at all patent cases—not just claim
construction cases—judges’ increased experience with patent litigation resulted in higher affirmance rates on appeal.138 He found that although the
reversal rate for all judges was about 15%, judges eligible for the pilot program would have a reversal rate of approximately 11%.139 Because
Shartzer’s analysis pre-dates the pilot program, however, he could not make
any comparative statement about how non-pilot judges fared compared to
pilot judges.140
Scholars Banks Miller and Brett Curry found a relationship between
judges’ political ideologies and their specialization when making obviousness determinations.141 They argue successfully that judges with more technical scientific experience are more likely than non-specialists to consider
patent cases “salient,” thus magnifying the influence of ideology on vote
choice for “expert” judges.142 Miller and Curry, also conclude, however, that
experience at the CAFC has no effect on decision making for obviousness
determinations.143
More recently, Kesan and Ball expanded on these studies with a robust
statistical analysis of how experience influences both the speed with which
a trial court decides a patent case and the proclivity of the CAFC to overturn the case on appeal.144 They found that judges with greater experience
heard cases faster, thereby impacting the accuracy of decision making in
137

See id. at 1102 (finding an increase in reversal rates for claim construction); Schwartz,
Practice Makes Perfect?, supra note 66, at 235 (summarizing and expanding upon Judge Moore’s
criticism of Chu’s results for failing to include the CAFC’s affirmative Rule 36 case construction
rulings).
138
Shartzer, supra note 29, at 228.
139
Id. at 227–28, 233.
140
Id. at 233.
141
See Miller & Curry, supra note 34, at 857 (finding that Clinton-appointed CAFC judges
who are considered experts will invalidate patents on obviousness grounds at a rate of 55% compared to 25% for Reagan-nominated expert appointees). Miller and Curry defined “patent experts
[as] those individuals who possessed technical degrees . . . and who were also members of the
patent bar.” Id. at 851 n.15. They find that ideology has no statistically significant impact on the
decisions of ideologically opposed non-expert judges. Id. at 857. Political scientists have long
theorized that individuals with greater knowledge or expertise have greater levels of ideological
constraint. See, e.g., Philip E. Converse, The Nature of Belief Systems Among Mass Publics, in
IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT 206, 206, 246–49 (David E. Apter ed., 1964) (confirming his hypothesis that those possessing greater political knowledge have more ideologically consistent
opinions).
142
See Miller & Curry, supra note 34, at 840.
143
Id. at 857.
144
Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 420.
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terms of whether the CAFC totally or partially reverses the trial court on
appeal.145 Their results applied not only to claim construction issues but also
to other areas of patent law, including validity, infringement, inequitable
conduct, damages, and preliminary injunction determinations.146 Although
they found that general experience in terms of years on the bench does not
affect the results, they discovered that specialized patent law experience
reduced the chance of the judgment being overturned on appeal in full and
in part on non-claim construction infringement cases as well as when the
CAFC had to decide cases emanating from preliminary injunctions or
judgment as a matter of law.147 Indeed, they found a 60% spread between
experienced and unexperienced judges in terms of whether the CAFC overturned an infringement ruling.148
Additionally, Mark A. Lemley et al. found that more experienced patent judges were less inclined to decide in favor of the patentee in infringement cases.149 By contrast, they found experience to be inconsequential
when ruling on validity.150 This experience effect, however, was weak; only
judges who rarely heard patent cases (defined as less than one final ruling
per three-year period) were more likely to rule in favor of the patentee.151
These results, Lemley et al. contend, rebut the conventional wisdom that
plaintiff forum shopping is driven in part by a perception that some district
courts are friendlier to certain kinds of parties.152 Although they found that
patentees holding patents in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical fields
were among the most likely patentees to prevail, they did not uncover support for the popular perception that plaintiffs have an easier time of winning
in the Eastern District of Texas.153 Lemley et al. concluded that judges with
more experience differ in their outcomes, but whether such a result is desirable is a matter of perspective.154 They postulate several reasons for the results, contending that the effect could be due to evolutions in attitude, more
familiarity with patent law that leads to greater confidence in one’s rulings,
145

Id.
Id. at 420, 432.
147
Id. at 439.
148
Id. Specifically, they found that the probability of an infringement ruling being overruled
for a judge of low patent experience was 45% compared to a 15% probability of a highlyexperienced judge’s ruling being overturned. Id.
149
Lemley et al., supra note 16, at 1151 (arguing that “[f]amiliarity . . . breeds contempt”).
150
Id.
151
Id. at 1143 (“Even a modest volume of patent cases . . . is enough to drive a significantly
higher rate of non[-]infringement findings. Once a judge has even a modest volume of patent cases, the effect levels off and further specialization does not appear to affect outcomes.”).
152
See id. at 1124–25, 1139–40 (countering prevalent forum shopping theories with evidence
that patentees are better off in front of judges who have little to no experience with patent cases).
153
Id. at 1125, 1139.
154
Id. at 1151–52.
146

2019]

Specialized Trial Courts in Patent Litigation

539

or simply more exposure to the unique procedures incident to patent law.155
A judge less versed in patent law may not feel as comfortable ruling on
summary judgment, for instance.156 Additionally, more experienced judges
may feel that patentees “overclaim” their inventions and thus grow more
skeptical once they see patentee after patentee claiming a broad invention.157 Given that, Lemley et al. argue that accused infringers as opposed to
patentees would benefit most from a specialized patent trial court.158
More recently, Mark A. Lemley and Shawn P. Miller analyzed judicial
factors that impact reversal rates.159 Accounting for judicial tenure, they
found that personal relationships between CAFC and district court judges
impacted reversal rates in claim construction cases, noting that district court
judges who previously sat by designation on the CAFC have reduced reversal rates.160 They concluded that this result was not a function of experience
but rather “reflects a personal connection between [district] judge and the
members of the reviewing court.”161
III. REVIEWING THE PATENT LAW PILOT PROGRAM
A. Description of the Patent Pilot Program
First introduced in 2007 by U.S. Representative Darrell Issa of California, the patent pilot program is designed to foster greater specialization
within the federal patent judiciary at the district court level.162 Appropriated
for five million dollars, the program intends to mitigate some of the problems inherent in patent litigation, such as “the high cost of patent litigation,
forum shopping, and high reversal rates on appeal” to the CAFC.163 The
legislative history implies that it was the hope of the pilot’s sponsors that
increased expertise would lead to lower reversal rates.164 The bill’s sponsors
argued that the high rate of overturned district court decisions was due to
“judicial inexperience and misunderstanding of patent law.”165 Any district
155

Id.
Id. at 1151.
157
Id. at 1151–52.
158
Id. at 1125.
159
Mark A. Lemley & Shawn P. Miller, If You Can’t Beat ’Em, Join ’Em? How Sitting by
Designation Affects Judicial Behavior, 94 TEX. L. REV. 451, 457 (2016).
160
Id. at 452.
161
Id. at 453.
162
Shartzer, supra note 29, at 192.
163
Id. at 192 & n.6.
164
Act of Jan. 4, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-349, § 1(e)(1), 124 Stat. 3674, 3675–76 (2011); see
also 156 CONG. REC. H8537 (2010) (“The premise underlying H.R. 628 is, succinctly stated,
practice makes perfect, or at least better. Judges who focus more attention on patent cases will be
expected to be better prepared to make decisions that can withstand appellate scrutiny.”).
165
153 CONG. REC. 3713 (2007).
156
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court within the top fifteen district courts having the greatest number of patent cases in 2010 could participate in the program, with district courts that
opted in having at least three judges in their district designated as patent
judges.166 If a non-designated generalist judge receives a patent law case
within the confines of the district court’s normal random allocation of cases,
the district court may then randomly reassign the case to a patent judge
within the district participating in the program.167 To discourage forum
shopping, the legislation requires that at least six districts in three circuits
participate.168 Only districts with at least ten judgeships were eligible initially, thus leaving out popular patent forums such as the District of Delaware
and the Eastern District of Texas.169 This provision was subsequently altered
to allow these districts to participate.170 The program’s funding allows judges to hire scientifically-trained law clerks and to provide training for judges
who decide to participate in the pilot.171 Participants in the program remain
free to take on cases of other subject matters as their schedule allows.172 The
program is designed to last for ten years and requires that periodic reports
be made to Congress.173 It went into operation in September 2011.174 Figure
1 details the district courts participating in the pilot program and Table 1
displays the number of judges participating in each of the pilot districts at
the start of the program in September 2011.175 Where the case lists multiple
judges, the pilot status of the presiding judge in the outcome of the case is
166

Act of Jan. 4, 2011 § 1(a)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A)(i), (b)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 3674–75; see also
H.R. 34, 110th Cong. § 1(a)–(b) (2007) (providing the initial proposal from the House of Representatives).
167
Act of Jan. 4, 2011 § 1(a)(1)(C)(D), (a)(3), 124 Stat. at 3674.
168
Id. § 1(b)(1).
169
See 153 CONG. REC. 3713 (discussing the parameters of the proposed legislation);
Shartzer, supra note 29, at 198, 199 n.65 (reviewing the requirements of the patent pilot program).
170
See Act of Jan. 4, 2011 § 1(b)(2)(B)(ii), 124 Stat. at 3675 (providing eligibility criteria for
districts with fewer than ten judges).
171
Shartzer, supra note 29, at 199; see also H.R. 34 § 1(f) (outlining the House’s funding
proposal).
172
See 153 CONG. REC. 3715 (2007) (describing the randomized assignment of cases in the
district courts). Additionally, senior judges may opt in as participants if an active judge also participates. Act of Jan. 4, 2011 § 1(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 3674.
173
Act of Jan. 4, 2011 § 1(c), (e), 124 Stat. at 3675–76.
174
WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 88, at 2 n.5. The program passed the House several times
with unanimous bipartisan support—a rarity in the existing political climate. Lemley et al., supra
note 16, at 1129.
175
See Ron Vogel, The Patent Pilot Program: Reassignment Rates and the Effect of Local
Patent Rules, N.Y. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N BULL. (N.Y. Intell. Prop. Law Ass’n, Fort Lee, N.J.),
Oct.–Nov. 2013, at 13, 17–18 (providing a full list of judges participating in the pilot program).
Some districts subsequently added judges to the program. See, e.g., General Order Regarding Pilot
Patent Project, General Order 16-3 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/goFiles/16-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6JQ-UBKQ] (adding Judge Schroeder to the
pilot program).
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used.176 At the program’s inception in 2011, there were eighty-five district
court judges and sixteen pilot magistrate judges.177
Figure 1*

176
In some cases, using this measure may be misleading. It is possible that a judge spent
significant time on a case, then retired, and the case was assigned to a new judge. Some courts
also periodically transfer cases due to workload. The line needs to be drawn somewhere, however,
and the judge who presided over the trial or authored the summary judgment motion or other opinion is most likely the one who spent the most time on the case.
177
See Steven Gray, The Designated Judges for the New Specialized Patent Pilot Program
for U.S. Courts, IP BASICS BLOG (Feb. 9, 2012), http://patentmyinvention.blogspot.com/2012/02/
new-specialized-patent-pilot-program.html [https://perma.cc/C483-LZ6M] (listing the pilot judges).
* All graphs and tables in this Article are also available online at
https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/60-2/semetgraphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VVD-PU4K].
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Table 1: Pilot Program Patent Cases and Judgeships
(as originally chosen on September 2011)
District
N.D.Cal.

Cases Filed from
Sept. 2011-Sept.
2016
1,122

Pilot Program Judgeships

Percent of District’s Judges

5 District Judges, 7
Magistrate Judges
5

39%

S.D.Cal.

616

C.D.Cal.

1.901

6

16%

182

4

30%

E.D.Tex.

7,943

6

71%

N.D.Tex.

382

3

21%

1,012

10

26%

S.D.N.Y.

698

10

20%

E.D.N.Y.

179

D.Nev.

N.D.Ill.

D.N.J.

1,030

6 District Judges, 9
Magistrate Judges
11

29%

53%
44%

W.D.Pa.

100

6

38%

D.Md.

149

3

17%

W.D.Tenn.

59

2

43%

S.D.Fla.178

699

3

12%

B. Patent Pilot Program 2016 Update
The FJC produced a report on the patent pilot program at the five-year
mark in April 2016.179 Its authors, Margaret S. Williams et al., found that
24% of district judges hearing at least one patent case (a total of sixty-six
judges) had participated in the pilot program thus far and that pilot judges
heard more than 76% of patent cases in the pilot districts.180 This figure varies among districts, with the lowest being 13% in the Eastern District of
New York and the highest being 33% in the Eastern District of Texas.181 As
178

The Southern District of Florida left the pilot program in 2014. Patent Pilot Program in
Southern District of Florida Scrubbed, ASSOULINE & BERLOWE (Aug. 13, 2014), https://assouline
berlowe.wordpress.com/2014/08/13/patent-pilot-program-in-southern-district-of-florida-scrubbed/
[https://perma.cc/6EJA-BWMX].
179
WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 88, at v.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 2, 3 tbl.3.
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a whole, pilot judges have more patent experience than non-pilot judges,
with judges in the Eastern District of Texas having substantially more patent
experience than judges in other districts.182 Overall, the authors concluded
that pilot judges work more expeditiously in terminating cases, with the
differences in total duration time being statistically significant.183 Controlling for the number of transfers and the judge’s experience, the FJC reported that pilot judges terminate cases 8% faster than non-pilot judges.184
The number of pilot cases also varies by district, with pilot cases comprising only 23% of the Northern District of California’s total patent cases,
but accounting for about 90% of patent cases in the Eastern District of Texas, the Western District of Tennessee, and the Western District of Pennsylvania.185 Despite this variation, Williams et al. found that the rate of appeal
did not differ between pilot and non-pilot judges, and that most cases—no
matter who presided over them—resulted in affirmances on appeal.186 The
study uncovered a great deal of variation among districts in the rates of appeal.187 For instance, as a portion of the overall case docket, appeals from
the Eastern District of Texas were relatively rare, although there was a larger than expected number of appeals from the three California districts in the
pilot program and the Southern District of New York.188 Appeals from the
Eastern District of Texas may have been low because only 1% of cases from
that district resulted in judgment, with the other aforementioned districts
having a greater percentage of their cases resulting in final judgment.189
Regarding the outcome on appeal, although Williams et al. looked only
at descriptive statistics, they found no statistically significant difference in
results between pilot and non-pilot judges.190 In all, they concluded that “pilot and non[-]pilot cases are ‘correct’ at approximately the same rate” with
72% of cases upheld in full by the CAFC on appeal.191 Loosening the definition of “correct” to include partial affirmances and dismissals, the FJC
reported that the CAFC affirmed the lower court 91% in pilot cases and
88% for non-pilot cases, a difference that was not statistically significant.192

182

Id. at 5, 6.
Id. at v, 22.
184
Id. at 23.
185
Id. at 8.
186
Id. at 32, 36.
187
See id. at 31–36 (exploring the impact on appeals to the CAFC from district judges).
188
Id. at 32, 33.
189
Id. at 33.
190
Id. at 36.
191
Id.
192
Id.
183
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More recently, a forum studying the pilot program in the Northern District
of Illinois reached similar conclusions about the pilot program.193
C. Data Collection for the Present Analysis
Using data from the database Lex Machina, this analysis draws from
25,223 patent cases filed from September 19, 2011 through September 30,
2016 with a termination date of December 31, 2018.194 Cases that had previously been filed prior to the pilot program initiation were then eliminated.
For instance, a case could have been filed in another district and transferred
after the September 19 date or the case could have been attached to a previously filed case.195 Figure 2 shows a map detailing the number of cases filed
per district. The most popular district, not surprisingly, is the Eastern District of Texas, with 7,943 cases filed during this period, with the District of
Delaware trailing in second place with 4,194 filed cases. About a fifth of the
District of Delaware’s entire docket is allocated to patent cases.196 As Figure
2 displays, other districts have very few cases filed comparably; for example, the District of Alaska has only one.
Figure 2

193
RIPL Volume 17 Executive Board, Comment, Patent Pilot Program Perspectives: Patent
Litigation in the Northern District of Illinois, 17 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 348, 359
(2018) [hereinafter Patent Pilot Program Perspectives].
194
See generally LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/ [https://perma.cc/39BP-XG7C]
(providing legal analytics).
195
Lex Machina counts a case multiple times if a case has been transferred either inter-district
or intra-district. I looked at the docket sheets of the 1,001 inter-district transfer cases and the sixtyseven intra-district cases filed during this period to ensure appropriately that the case would be
allocated to the district court where it was filed when discussing filing and where it was ruled on
when discussing case merits.
196
Shartzer, supra note 29, at 237 (noting that about 17% of cases filed in the District of Delaware are patent cases).
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1. Global Differences in Cases in Pilot and Non-Pilot Districts
Overall, more patent cases are filed or transferred to the pilot districts,
though certain pilot districts hear few cases. For instance, the Western District of Pennsylvania and the Western District of Tennessee had ninety-six
and fifty-five cases, respectively, filed during the period under study. As the
FJC also reports, although the courts transfer some cases to include them in
the pilot, the average number of transfers is zero.197 A district court internally transfers cases within a district for many reasons, such as recusal or because the case is closely connected to another case; some districts also
transfer cases to other divisions to balance out caseload.198 The FJC reports
that 72% of transfers are because of the pilot program.199 For the most part,
as time goes on, few judges kick the case back into the patent pool, though
the differences vary by district.200 As of 2013, for instance, only about 10%
of judges in the Southern District of New York were declining an initial patent assignment.201 According to the database, transfers are more common
in the Southern District of Florida, the Central District of California, and the
Western District of Pennsylvania, whereas transfers are less common in the
Northern District of California and the Southern District of New York, partly due to the fact that a low percentage of judges participate in the pilot in
the latter districts.202
Looking at the data by unique plaintiffs asserting different patents,
some districts are more popular among either repeat plaintiffs filing on the
same patent (for example, a pharmaceutical company filing multiple infringement cases against generic manufacturers) or so-called “patent trolls”
filing multiple cases. Controlling for repeat filers, however, the number of
197

WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 88, at 10.
See id. (discussing various reasons for transferring a case).
199
Id. Although there are intra-district transfers because of the pilot program, they are probably less than what the program’s developers anticipated. See id.
200
See, e.g., Robert Gunther & Omar Khan, Patent Pilot Program: One Year Later, N.Y. L.J.,
Jan. 7, 2013, at S6 (describing trends in the pilot program with a focus on the Southern District of
New York).
201
Id.
202
Some districts make it easier to tell whether a transfer is actually due to reassignment under the pilot program. The docket sheet for the Western District of Pennsylvania, for instance,
notes when a judge declines an assignment because of the pilot program, while other districts’
docket sheets note the appropriate local rule to signify an intra-district transfer because of the pilot
program. In other districts, however, it is impossible to tell from the docket sheet why a transfer
was made. Moreover, sometimes cases are transferred due to cases being related, which may mask
the true extent to which patent cases are being disproportionately reassigned to pilot judges. The
docket sheet will note that the transfer is due to the cases being related, even though the first case
was transferred due to the pilot program. In some districts such as the Western District of Pennsylvania or the Central District of California, a large majority of the district’s patent cases are
heard by pilot judges and are transferred internally, whether by official transfer through the pilot
program, intradistrict transfer because the cases are related, or transfers to balance out workload.
198
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cases in some districts dramatically declines. For instance, using this more
limited definition of case type limited by patent, there are only about 1,200
patent cases sharing the same plaintiff and patents asserted filed in the Eastern District of Texas, a near six-fold decline. This change indicates that the
district is a popular forum for filing with patent trolls and serial filers.203
Figure 3 displays a comparison of technology by pilot and non-pilot
judges. Overall, 69% of cases before pilot judges concern computers and
communications, compared to just 52% before the non-pilot judges, a figure
that is statistically significant.204 The spread between technology categories,
however, equalizes by excluding the Eastern District of Texas, a forum popular for filing computer cases, from the analysis. In addition, more medical
and drug cases are filed in the non-pilot districts (14% versus 9%) overall,
perhaps due to the fact that so many medical and drug cases are filed in the
District of Delaware, a non-pilot district. Overall, non-pilot judges see more
chemical, electronics, medical and drug, mechanical, and “other” technologies as a percent of its docket than do pilot dockets. Non-pilot judges also
see more unique cases. For instance, an individual patentee not affiliated
with a corporation may file a patent infringement suit in their local district
court whereas large corporations with an extensive patent portfolio may file
in popular patent districts. Looking at the breakdown by pilot districts versus non-pilot districts, rather than pilot versus non-pilot judges, the percentages are similar, mirroring that of the judge analysis overall.205

203

See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 88, at 29–30, 30 tbl.26 (analyzing “serially filed cases,”
noting that 86% of cases are serially filed in the Eastern District of Texas).
204
These trends persist examining the data by eliminating cases with the same plaintiff involving the same patent portfolio. Under those circumstances, 48% of all cases filed before pilot
judges concern computers and communications compared to 33% before non-pilot judges. Nonpilot judges also see more cases involving the other categories, though the percent of drug cases is
about the same, partly because so many pharmaceutical cases are also heard in the District of New
Jersey as well as the District of Delaware. Some scholars do not conduct significance tests because
their database, like the present study’s, consists of the entire population of cases under study. See,
e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1095
(2008) (“[B]ecause our dataset consists of the entire population of cases of interest . . . and not a
sample of cases from the population, . . . for most issues there is no need to conduct significance
tests on the basic summary figures . . . .”). In statistics, one can assess whether a difference in two
sample means is statistically significant by conducting various statistical tests, such as t-tests. The
present study, however, consists of the full population of cases, not simply a randomly drawn
sample. Nonetheless, hypothesis testing was conducted using chi-squared analysis to determine
whether the means of select groups differ from one another and those results are presented where
applicable.
205
It is difficult to tease out the direction of causality; that is, whether certain cases are filed
deliberately in districts for their technical expertise on a given technology, or whether coincidentally, the geographic concentration of certain industries results in more patent cases of a given
technological type filed in a given district.
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Figure 3

Case disposition varies among the districts. Overall, almost 90% of
cases settle in some way, either by stipulated dismissal (57%) or with the
plaintiff voluntarily dismissing the case (29%).206 Another 4% of cases get
resolved by consent judgment, and about 1% of cases are default judgments. Only about 2% of all cases ever filed go to trial (with slightly more
proceeding to a jury trial as opposed to a bench trial), with about 6% of cases dismissed on motion for substantive or procedural reasons and 2% of
cases resolved by summary judgment.207 Many of the consent judgment
cases actually occur after the court issues a claim construction ruling in
these cases and the parties stipulate to non-infringement or validity of the
patent based on the claim construction ruling.

206

Sometimes parties will voluntarily dismiss a case only to refile the case in another district,
further complicating the analysis. This occurs most often with parties filing in the Eastern District
of Texas or the District of Delaware and then abandoning the case only to refile somewhere else.
In addition, about 2% of cases are procedurally stayed pending review of another case or pending
review of the patent at the Patent and Trademark Appeals Board (“PTAB”). About 1% of cases
also are subject to multidistrict litigation and 3% are consolidated. A small percentage of cases are
also subject to severance motions or are transferred inter-district or intra-district. The above percentages ignore these procedural postures.
207
These figures include all cases, including cases filed by repeat litigants or cases filed by
the same plaintiff against different defendants. District courts have different rules regarding joinder so these numbers may vary depending on how one collates the cases under study. See, e.g.,
Klerman & Reilly, supra note 83, at 257–59 (noting the unique joinder rules in the Eastern District
of Texas).
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As detailed in Figure 4, case disposition is similar between pilot and
non-pilot judges, although differences between them are statistically significant. Pilot judges see more stipulated dismissals (61% v. 54%) as well as
more consolidated cases.208 Overall, stipulated dismissals and plaintiff voluntary dismissals comprise 89% of pilot judge resolutions compared to 84%
in the non-pilot courts. Moreover, non-pilot judges resolve cases more frequently with dismissal motions (7% v. 3%). Excluding the Eastern District
of Texas, however, the differences between pilot and non-pilot judges in
terms of case disposition become less noticeable. Differences between pilot
and non-pilot judges on the percent of cases resolved by motions to dismiss
or summary judgment are no longer statistically significant excluding the
Eastern District of Texas, partly because judges in the Eastern District of
Texas disfavor summary judgment motions.209 Stipulated dismissals are
similar between pilot and non-pilot judges excluding the Eastern District of
Texas, although the difference is still statistically significant. These trends
continue when one eliminates duplicate plaintiffs asserting cases involving
the same patent. In that analysis, non-pilot judges resolve more cases
through summary judgment than pilot judges while pilot judges hold more
trials than their non-pilot counterparts.
Figure 4

208

Both stipulated dismissals and voluntary dismissals are, in essence, settlements. Stipulated
dismissals are sometimes necessary in cases involving counterclaims, such as cases in which the
defendant asks for a declaratory judgment of invalidity and/or non-infringement.
209
See id. at 251 (characterizing the Eastern District of Texas “hostile” to summary judgments).
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2. Judge Differences Across Pilot Versus Non-Pilot Judges
Pilot judges on the whole have more patent experience than non-pilot
judges, though they have had a shorter tenure as judges than non-pilot judges. Overall, among the cases appealed, non-pilot judges have a median of
twelve years of experience as a federal district court judge compared to
eleven years for pilot judges. Not surprisingly, however, pilot judges have
more experience with patent cases. Within the last five years from February
2014 through January 2019, pilot judges have presided over a median of
eighty-one patent cases compared to twenty-eight for non-pilot judges.
Eliminating the Eastern District of Texas in the pilot cases and the District
of Delaware for the non-pilot cases, pilot judges presided over a median of
more than seventy-three patent cases compared to just twenty-eight for nonpilot judges. Pilot judges also have almost double the amount of trial and
claim construction experience, overseeing a median number of seven claim
construction hearings over the past five years compared to just three for
non-pilot judges. Moreover, pilot judges oversaw a median of two trials
compared to just one trial for judges in the non-pilot districts. Notable outliers exist among district court judges, as well. For example, Judge James
Rodney Gilstrap in the Eastern District of Texas has presided over 5,000
cases to termination; Judge Sue Robinson in the District of Delaware presided over the next highest figure—almost 700 cases to termination in the
last five years. Likewise, some judges who have served as many as forty
years on the bench have presided on only one or two patent cases.
Table 2: Patent Experience by Pilot Judge Status
Mean Judicial Tenure
Median Judicial Tenure
Mean Terminated Patent
Cases
Median Terminated Patent Cases
Mean Claim Construction
Hearings
Median Claim Construction Hearings
Mean Patent Trials
Median Patent Trials

Pilot Judge
11.1
11
201.7 (101.1)*

Non-Pilot Judges
13.0
12
93.2 (69.2)*

81 (73)*

28 (28)*

17.0 (8.7)*

8.3 (4.6)*

7 (6)*

3 (2)*

4.4 (2.5)*
2 (1)*

2.4 (1.4)*
1 (1)*

* Numbers in parentheses represent figures excluding judges from the Eastern District of Texas in pilot courts and the District of Delaware in the non-pilot courts.
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3. Appealed Cases Comparing Pilot Versus Non-Pilot Judges
Pilot and non-pilot judges also differ in the type of cases that are decided on the merits and that are ultimately appealed to the CAFC. Less than
5% of cases in the database continue the appeal process through completion.210 The appeal rate is slightly higher for cases before non-pilot judges
(5% v. 3%).211 It is difficult to assess how to measure the “appeal” rate,
however. In many cases, parties file a notice to appeal, only to settle the
case or for the case to be dismissed under Federal Circuit Rule 42(a).212
The present analysis reinforces the notion that variation exists among
districts in their appeal trends. Williams et al. found that almost 50% of appeals hail from one of the California pilot districts, with 33% of appealed
pilot cases being filed from one of the three California pilot courts.213 They
also found that, as a percent of its total cases, the Eastern District of Texas
saw relatively few of its cases appealed, primarily due to how few cases in
the Eastern District of Texas end in a judgment on the merits.214 The FJC
report, however, analyzed all cases, including procedural cases.215 The present analysis finds that some districts, like the Western District of Pennsylvania, have a high appeal rate because they resolve a greater percentage of
substantive patent law cases, whereas other districts, like the Eastern District of New York, have a much lower appeal rate with no appealed cases
involving patent trolls. Table 3 shows the appeal rate for cases for all of the
pilot districts and select non-pilot districts that heard more than 300 patent
cases during the time frame under study or who had the most number of
210
During the period under study, about one-hundred cases heard on appeal concerned procedural issues, which are not analyzed here but which are included in the calculation of the appeal
rate. See infra notes 223–230 and accompanying text.
211
These figures cover all cases including both substantive and procedural issues. Limited to
only cases sharing unique plaintiffs asserting the same patents, the appeal rate increases to 6%,
with a greater percentage of appeals coming from the non-pilot judges (7% v. 6%). Calculations
based on uniqueness may underestimate the number of unique cases since it may be that two cases
are alike except that one case involves an additional patent not asserted in the other case.
212
To measure appeal rate, this analysis relies on Lex Machina’s codings on appeal rate. This
measure is somewhat over-inclusive due to the fact that many parties do not continue prosecuting
their appeal. About 7% of cases were coded with an “appeal” tag on Lex Machina. Cases that
terminated before January 1, 2016, were then eliminated on the assumption that if the CAFC has
not issued an opinion as of December 31, 2018, the appeal is no longer pending three years later,
which brought down the number of completed or pending appealed cases to 4%. There may be
cases that terminated prior to 2016 that are still pending as of January 1, 2019, as there may be
some cases that were terminated after 2015 that have since been settled or dismissed. In addition,
it is impossible to measure the number of potentially appealable issues that may be pending for
current or past cases. For instance, parties may file an appeal after the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction.
213
WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 88, at 32.
214
Id. at 32, 33.
215
Id. at 35.
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cases appealed. For instance, non-pilot technology-centered districts like the
Western District of Washington or the Eastern District of Virginia have a
disproportionate number of cases appealed. The second column displays the
appeal rate for all cases, while the third column shows the appeal rate for
cases involving unique plaintiffs and patents. Generally, the appeal rate is
often higher limiting the analysis to cases involving a unique set of patents.
For instance, the appeal rate drops to 5% in the Eastern District of Texas
from 1.9% since almost half of the appealed cases involve patent trolls.
Overall, these findings coincide with those of Williams et al., namely that
appeals disproportionately come from the California districts, most notably
from the Northern District of California.216

216

See id. at 32 (hypothesizing reasons for varied appeal rates among pilot districts).
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Table 3: Rate of Appeal for Patent Cases
All Cases

Unique Cases

C.D.Cal.

4.3 (3.1)*

5.6 (4.7)*

N.D.Cal.

10.2 (6.7)*

9.6 (5.6)*

S.D.Cal.

6.9 (5.9)*

8.2 (9.2)*

E.D.Tex.

1.9 (1.7)*

5.0 (4.8)*

N.D.Tex.

5.5 (5.0)*

6.4 (5.8)*

S.D.N.Y.

6.2 (8.1)*

6.8 (7.5)*

E.D.N.Y.

3.3 (2.9)*

2.0 (1.4)*

S.D.Fla.

4.4 (5.6)*

8.0 (13.0)*

D.Nev.

5.6 (5.5)*

7.4 (7.0)*

N.D.Ill.

3.8 (3.9)*

5.5 (5.1)*

D.N.J.

6.0 (7.5)*

6.0 (7.5)*

D.Md.

4.1 (3.6)*

5.9 (2.9)*

W.D.Pa.

7.5 (7.7)*

10.8 (11.3)*

W.D.Tenn.

5.2 (5.3)*

4.2 (4.4)*

5.8

9.4

D.Del.
D.Mass.

6.5

9.2

N.D.Tex.

5.5

6.4

W.D.Wash.

11.2

9.2

W.D.Wis.

8.4

11.0

M.D.Fla.

3.1

4.3

E.D.Va.

9.8

14.5

W.D.Tex.

4.8

4.4

D.Minn.

4.3

3.1

D.Utah

3.9

4.2

0

0

E.D.Mich.

*Signifies cases from pilot judge in a pilot district.

Almost half of appealed patent cases arise from summary judgment
motions or consent or stipulated judgments based on the district court’s prior decision on a dispositive motion or after its decision on claim construction. Dismissals make up about a quarter of appealed patent cases with trials
and judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) motions splitting the remaining
quarter. Figure 5 details the spread of case disposition across pilot and nonpilot judges for cases in which the CAFC either has heard an appeal as of
December 31, 2018 or an appeal is pending given the definition of appealed
cases. The types of cases appealed are similar across pilot and non-pilot
districts. Although Williams et al. concluded that summary judgment motions made up only 2% of total case dispositions before pilot judges, summary judgment motions are the most common disposition of cases heard on
appeal, likely because the stakes are so high for the losing party, which
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makes the costs of appeal very low.217 Judges may grant summary judgment
only when litigants do not dispute the case’s facts, so more frivolous or
clear-cut cases may simply be decided in the local tribunal—often a nonpilot court—in which the case is first filed.218 That a greater percentage of
summary judgment (24% v. 22%), dismissal on the pleadings (9% v. 7%),
and stipulated dismissal (18% v. 15%) appeals originate from non-pilot
judges provides further support for this assessment.219 Consequently, competitors may move to transfer the case away from the non-pilot judge later
on in the process should dismissal be denied. Appeals from consent judgments arising most frequently from claim construction rulings are more
common in cases before pilot judges (9% v. 7%). Figure 6 details the case
disposition by pilot status involving cases with unique plaintiffs asserting a
unique group of patents. Here, appeals from jury/JMOL motions (18% v.
15%) and bench trials (13% v. 10%) are more common before pilot judges.
As with the analyses on all cases, non-pilot judges have more appealed cases emanating from judgment on the pleadings than pilot judges (27% v.
19%), but cases dismissed procedurally (18% v. 14%) or by consent judgment (8% v. 5%) are more common before pilot judges. These trends concerning case disposition among appeals involving unique plaintiffs and patents also are seen when examining just the subset of appealed cases that
have an issued CAFC opinion as of December 31, 2018 on a substantive
patent issue.

217

Id. at 28 tbl.23; see also Klerman & Reilly, supra note 83, at 254 (discussing the pros and
cons for patentees in seeking trial and avoiding summary judgment).
218
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (providing the requirements for summary judgment).
219
The FJC similarly reports that there is a statistically significant difference between pilot
and non-pilot judges in terms of dismissals, finding that non-pilot cases see more voluntarily dismissals, a finding which is replicated here. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 88, at 14. The present
analysis also indicates that these differences extend to dismissals granted by stipulated motions to
dismiss or motions on the pleadings. However, pilot judges have a greater percent of cases on
appeal concerning procedural motions to dismiss.

554

Boston College Law Review

Figure 5

Figure 6

[Vol. 60:519

2019]

Specialized Trial Courts in Patent Litigation

555

Figure 7 details the type of technology at issue in appealed cases broken down by unique plaintiffs asserting unique patents in order to get a better sense of the technology spread. Patents concerning computers and communications take up the largest share of appealed cases. Over 46% percent
of patent cases arising before pilot judges concern computers and communications compared to 40% cases before non-pilot judges. Drug cases are
the next highest category, making up slightly less than a quarter of appealed
cases from both groups. While cases involving electronic patents are more
common in appeals from pilot judges, cases concerning the other technologies—chemical, mechanical, and the catch-all “other” category—are more
common in the appealed cases coming from the non-pilot judges compared
to the pilot judges. These patterns persist even if one excludes the Eastern
District of Texas from the analysis. These broad trends also persist when
limiting the analysis to only cases where the CAFC has issued an opinion as
of December 31, 2018 on a substantive patent law issue except that chemical cases are more prevalent in the non-pilot group and electronics cases are
more common in the pilot group.
Figure 7

What does this data suggest about the cases that are not appealed? Of
the approximately 25,000 cases in the database, 92% of the cases are not
appealed or the appeals end in dismissal or settlement. Figure 8 details a
graph of the case disposition of cases that are not considered appealed.
Across districts, the vast majority of non-appealed cases end up settling or
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being resolved by consent decrees. But, there are some noticeable differences across pilot and non-pilot judges. For instance, of the non-appealed
cases before pilot judges, pilot judges see more stipulated dismissals (64%
v. 56%) and cases in which the plaintiff voluntarily agrees to dismiss the
case.220 The opposite is true for cases resolved by summary judgment motions; of the non-appealed cases, non-pilot judges resolve more cases by
summary judgment or procedural motions to dismiss. Although a fuller description of the characteristics of non-appealed cases is beyond the scope of
this Article, the data nonetheless suggest differences between appealed and
non-appealed cases and between pilot and non-pilot judges.221
Figure 8

IV. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS: HOW HAS THE PILOT
PATENT PROGRAM FARED?
This Part details the statistical analysis of the impact of the pilot program so far in terms of how district court judges decide cases and how those
cases are ultimately resolved on appeal.222
220
Further, the difference is even less stark when excluding the Eastern District of Texas from
the pilot group and the District of Delaware from the non-pilot group from the analysis (54% v.
53% for stipulated dismissals and 33% v. 30% for plaintiff voluntary dismissals).
221
In a separate article, I study how pilot judges differ from non-pilot judges in how they
decide cases. See Amy Semet, An Empirical Examination of Patent Law in the District Courts
(working paper) (on file with author) (examining district court decision making in patent cases
over the last ten years).
222
See infra notes 223–300 and accompanying text.

2019]

Specialized Trial Courts in Patent Litigation

557

A. Case Selection
The present analysis relies upon all substantive patent law cases filed
from September 19, 2011 to September 30, 2016 and decided by the CAFC
through December 2018.223 As a separate measure, the analysis also reviews
district court rulings drawn from all CAFC decisions published on the
CAFC website that were decided after January 1, 2012. Additionally, the
database of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP assisted
with the tracking of appellate patent cases.224 Each trial court and appellate
court decision was coded for both the specific patent law issue addressed as
well as the overall result as to whether the patentee or the competitor prevailed. Applicable data was cross-checked using the Compendium of Federal Circuit decisions.225 This analysis includes all decisions from the CAFC,
including summary affirmances under Rule 36, but omits cases that were
dismissed under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b) because those
decisions were not on the merits.226 The analysis focuses on the following
key issues: validity, infringement, claim construction, inequitable conduct,
and preliminary injunctions.
Notably, several broad categories of cases are excluded from the analysis. Jury verdict cases are eliminated unless they are accompanied by the

223
Eight of the pilot districts started the program on the recommended date of September 19,
2011: Central District of California, Southern District of California, Northern District of Illinois,
District of Maryland, District of Nevada, Western District of Pennsylvania, Western District of
Tennessee, and the Eastern District of Texas. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 88, at 2 n.5. The other
pilot courts started on the following dates: September 1, 2011, for the Northern District of Texas,
September 18, 2011, for the District of New Jersey, November 21, 2011, for the Southern District
of New York, January 1, 2012, for the Northern District of California, and January 10, 2012, for
the Eastern District of New York. Id. For the ease of the analysis, this study uses a uniform start
date of September 19, 2011.
224
Federal Circuit IP Decisions, FINNEGAN, https://www.finnegan.com/en/tools/index.html
[https://perma.cc/F3XX-D7UY]. The Lex Machina database omitted some cases that were located
on Finnegan’s website and confirmed on the Federal Circuit website. Those cases are not included
in the study.
225
Federal Circuit Decisions Database, U. IOWA, https://fedcircuit.shinyapps.io/federal
compendium [https://perma.cc/T6GL-4874]. For discussion of the methodology and contents of the
Compendium of Federal Circuit decisions, see The Compendium of Federal Circuit Decisions, U.
IOWA, https://empirical.law.uiowa.edu/compendium-federal-circuit-decisions and Jason Rantanen,
The Landscape of Modern Patent Appeals, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 985 (2018).
226
Compare FED. CIR. R. 36 (allowing “[t]he court [to] enter a judgment of affirmance without opinion”), with FED. R. APP. P. 42(b) (providing for voluntary dismissal of an appeal “if the
parties file a signed dismissal agreement”). Although the CAFC may affirm without a written
opinion, it cannot use Rule 36 to reverse. Rule 36 affirmances are used most often for minor issues
or frivolous appeals but they are also used occasionally when the district court writes so thorough
an opinion that it is not necessary for the CAFC to add its own reasoning by issuing an opinion.
Ultimately, claim construction issues are less likely to be affirmed under Rule 36 than are other
patent-related issues. Olson, supra note 132, at 772.
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court ruling on a JMOL motion.227 Default judgments, or cases in which the
parties do not resolve any substantive patent law issue and the court awards
relief to the non-defaulting party, are excluded, as are non-final judgments,
such as denials of motions to dismiss or denials of summary judgment because these issues are not appealed. Furthermore, cases do not appear where
the issue in dispute primarily concerns an issue of state law, with the patent
law issue being tangential to the main issue of the case.228 The few cases in
which the district court hears the case on remand from the CAFC or the Supreme Court and the appeal comes up for a second or even a third time are
also excluded. Because the CAFC may give detailed guidance on the law in
the case in the prior appeal, inclusion of these cases in the analysis could
cloud the results. Therefore, the case is included only if the issues were separate; that is, one case includes a preliminary injunction motion and the
second case is decided on the merits.229
The analysis focuses solely on cases in which the court makes a decision on a substantive patent law issue. As such, purely procedural cases are
excluded, such as cases concerning whether to transfer a case from one district court to another by seeking a writ of mandamus; whether personal jurisdiction should be exercised over a given company; various discovery
matters, such as whether to include or exclude expert testimony or whether
to issue a subpoena; whether the complaint properly pleads the facts; and
cases that primarily concern damages or willful infringement. Moreover,
cases dealing with whether a party should be held in contempt for violating
an injunction or should be sanctioned for engaging in discovery abuse are
eliminated. Cases concerning whether there should be a stay pending reexamination or inter partes review are also not included because the decision
does not rest on the merits. Cases in which the CAFC rules on the frivolousness of the patentee’s case and the accordant award of attorneys’ fees to
the losing party do not appear in the analysis. Also not included are cases
based on jurisdiction, personal or subject matter, or whether legal principles
preclude a patent infringement claim, such as if a pending arbitration or li227
A jury verdict without a JMOL motion is rare, so only a few cases are excluded under this
criterion.
228
Based on the data, cases focused on state law with tangential patent law issues occur frequently in cases involving licenses. Although as a factual matter, the CAFC has jurisdiction in
patent license cases, the issue in those cases centers more on contract interpretation than patent
law. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 112, at 65 n.176, 68 (outlining the patent-related jurisdiction of
the CAFC); Rifkind, supra note 114, at 425 (discussing areas of the law overlapping with patent
law). Some of these cases are coded by Lex Machina as contract cases and were not included in
the database.
229
For more details about the statistical analysis, see the online Appendix at
https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/60-2/semetappendix.pdf [https://perma.cc/VRK9-KJZ5].
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cense bars suit. Finally, the analysis excludes all appeals from the former
Board of Patent Appeals and Inferences (now the Patent Trial and Appeals
Board, or PTAB) and the USITC, two administrative agencies within which
the CAFC holds exclusive review, because the object of this study is to analyze the impact of specialization in the district courts, not in the administrative state.230
B. Key Variables of Interest
1. Dependent Variable: Predicting Reversal
The key dependent variable is whether the CAFC overturns the district
court decision. There were two alternative variables, similar to Kesan and
Ball’s study: complete reversal and partial reversal.231 In some cases, relying on the label given by the CAFC to a given case is misleading; for instance, the CAFC may affirm and remand the case but the case is remanded
on a purely technical or minor issue that has nothing to do with the “wrongness” of the lower court’s decision. As such, each case was read to discern
whether the CAFC actually found fault with all or part of the lower court’s
decision. In most cases, these findings comport with the CAFC’s classifications, but to the extent they do not, this analysis relies on an independent
reading of the case.
The outcome of each case is coded on a sliding scale to measure the
accuracy of the decision in one of the following categories: affirmed; affirmed, vacated, and remanded; affirmed, reversed, and vacated; affirmed
and reversed; vacated and remanded; vacated; reversed, vacated, and remanded; reversed and remanded; and reversed. The variable is then dichotomized into two binary choices: whether the decision is fully affirmed or
there is an error in part.232 In determining whether there is an error in part,
different criteria create two different versions of the variable. One version
of the variable considers all cases that are “vacated and remanded,” “vacated,” “reversed, vacated, and remanded,” “reversed and remanded,” and “reversed” to be ones in which there is an “error.” Each case is examined to
ascertain the seriousness of the error. For instance, if the CAFC largely affirms the trial court, but refuses to find that the defendant acts willfully,
230

Because this analysis is organized by case instead of by appeal, it does not risk including
cross appeals, which would result in double counts. Cross appeals are noted and the case facts
were considered when discerning whether the ruling favored the patentee or the competitor. The
case was then coded accordingly.
231
See Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 433 (characterizing “appellate rulings as either fully
affirming a district court’s decision . . . or not”).
232
See id. at 434 (“Second, and separately, we distinguished appellate rulings on issues as
either affirmed ‘fully or in part’ or found to be completely in error . . . .”). This study includes as
overturned in full both reversed and vacated cases.
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damages would increase three-fold. That scenario is an affirmance in spirit,
especially if the main issues in the case are ones of infringement and validity; the court is simply declining to award more damages.233 By contrast, if
the patentee appeals a damage issue and the CAFC devotes all or most of its
opinion to analyze the damage issue, the CAFC’s decision on willfulness is
the primary issue in the case and thus is not included in the analysis, because the universe of cases only concerns substantive patent law issues.
Overall, across pilot and non-pilot judges, the CAFC overwhelmingly
affirms cases, at least in part. Limited to only substantive cases involving
infringement, validity, inequitable conduct, claim construction, and preliminary injunctions and including Rule 36 affirmances, the CAFC overrules
about 15% of cases in full and between 20–25% in part, depending upon the
definition of “in part.” Although pilot judges have a slightly higher overrule
rate, the difference is not statistically significant. Restricting the analysis to
cases resolved by opinion, as opposed to Rule 36, the spread between pilot
and non-pilot courts increases.
Each “main mistake” made by the district court, as perceived by the
appellate court, is coded as belonging to one of eight categories: (1) claim
construction; (2) infringement  non-infringement;( 3) non-infringement
 infringement; (4) patent invalid  patent valid; (5) patent valid  patent
invalid; (6) ruling that a preliminary injunction should not issue  ruling
that it should issue; (7) ruling that a preliminary injunction should issue 
ruling that it should not issue; and (8) other errors such as errors concerning
damages or regarding inequitable conduct. In particular, coding for error in
claim construction analysis can be difficult. When ruling on infringement or
invalidity, courts must often construe the claims to aid in their analysis, so
sometimes it can be difficult to tell if the CAFC reverses a lower court decision because of claim construction or because of some other issue like infringement or invalidity. Moreover, because interlocutory appeal is not
available for claim construction issues, claim construction only arises in the
context of an infringement or invalidity action.234 As such, each case is read
to determine if claim construction is the “main mistake.” Sometimes it is
easy to discern where the case primarily concerns claim construction because the CAFC makes it clear or because the case results from a consent
judgment where the parties stipulate to infringement based on the district
court’s claim construction. Other times the determination requires an individualized judgment call. In most of the infringement cases, the issue boils
down to claim construction. Parties may also contest the written description,
233

The database excludes the cases that only considered as an issue whether to grant or deny
attorneys’ fees. If fees were one of several issues, however, the case was included.
234
28 U.S.C. § 1292(c) (2018).
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definiteness, best mode, or enablement of the patent under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112.235 Such determinations, especially analysis under section 112, require
interpretation of the claims and could arguably be considered claim construction cases, but because application of the law of validity is paramount
in such an analysis, the cases were counted as validity cases (or validity
mistakes in this instance).
Non-pilot judges make different kinds of mistakes than pilot judges.
Non-pilot judges in particular are more likely than pilot judges to make errors when claim construction is a dispositive issue in the case (39% of the
primary mistakes for non-pilot judges versus 31% for pilot judges). Another
third of the primary mistakes made by non-pilot judges concern improperly
finding a patent invalid while almost a quarter of the primary mistakes by
pilot judges concern improper denial of preliminary injunctions. Pilot judges also have a greater percentage of cases than non-pilot judges with infringement mistakes.
2. Key Independent Variable: Judicial Experience and Inclusion in Pilot
Program
The key independent variable in the case is judicial experience. Other
scholars code for judicial experience.236 Shartzer, for instance, looks at previous appellate experience, whereas Schwartz relies specifically on patent
trial experience.237 Kesan and Ball analyze general experience, measured as
the number of years the judge serves on the bench, as well as specialized
experience, measured by experience in patent law cases.238 They also look
at both cumulative experience, measured by the judge’s total number of patent cases heard over their time on the bench, as well as recent patent law
experience ascertained by looking at how many cases they heard in the
three years prior to the filing date of the case in question.239
The present analysis uses a direct account of judicial experience to test
whether the judges participating in the pilot program act differently than
judges not participating in the program. As such, one version of the “experience” variable is a dummy variable coded “1” for whether the judge in
235

35 U.S.C. § 112 (2018).
See, e.g., Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 420 (considering how experience might influence
patent law litigation metrics); Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?, supra note 66, at 240–41 (considering judicial experience on the bench and with patent cases); Shartzer, supra note 29, at 228
(coding for judicial experience with patent cases).
237
Compare Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?, supra note 66, at 240–41 (gathering career
biographical information and the number of patent cases heard by the judge between 1995–2005),
with Shartzer, supra note 29, at 228 (considering years served and “history of appellate review at
the [CAFC]”).
238
Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 420, 423.
239
Id. at 423 & n.187.
236
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question participates in the pilot program (and coded “0” if the judge is not
a participant). An alternative experience variable focuses on whether the
trial judge in question is part of a district participating in the pilot program.
Although that particular judge may not be a part of the project, judges sitting in districts participating in the project may have de facto access, greater
resources, or more knowledge by being in close physical proximity to judges who are part of the pilot program.
Other “experience” variables that may be a better reflection of experience are also included. The patent pilot program proposed by the House of
Representatives initially excluded some of the judges who hear the greatest
number of patent cases by requiring that any participating district have at
least ten judgeships.240 The final statute, however, includes smaller districts,
like the Eastern District of Texas.241 Notably, the pilot program excludes the
District of Delaware, which historically is one of the most popular patent
filing districts.242 One judge in Delaware, Judge Sue Robinson, heard more
cases that were subsequently appealed than any other judge in the database.
Furthermore, certain judges in Massachusetts, Arizona, Wisconsin, the District of Columbia, Virginia, and other states have developed regional experience in patent law cases, as measured by the number of appeals in the short
time frame under study. As such, this analysis created two alternative
measures of “experience.” In the first measure, judges from the District of
Delaware are added to the list of pilot program judges as 16% of the cases
in the database hail from Delaware. Alternatively, a variable coded as “1”
any judge in the database who has above the median number of patent trials
(fifty-eight) in the past five years.
These measures may not necessarily be a fair measure of “experience.”
Particular judges may have a lot of experience in patent litigation, but for
whatever reason, many of the cases from their courtroom end up settling. A
judge could have experience in infringement analysis but not in validity
determinations or in holding Markman hearings. As the FJC reported, although Markman hearings are held in 4% of cases, more than half (60%) of
Markman hearings are held before pilot judges.243
In addition to the pilot judge variable, this analysis includes an additional measure of patent experience, measured by the number of patent cas240
See 153 CONG. REC. 3713 (2007) (outlining the proposed requirements); Shartzer, supra
note 29, at 198, 199 n.65 (discussing the program’s initial requirements).
241
See Act of Jan. 4, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-349, § 1(b)(2)(B), 124 Stat. 3674, 3675 (2011)
(providing two sets of eligibility criteria based on the district’s number of judgeships); WILLIAMS
ET AL., supra note 88, at 2 n.5 (naming the districts participating in the patent pilot program).
242
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 9, at 17 fig.3 (tracking the “[n]umber of
[d]efendants in [p]atent [i]nfringement [s]uits” in Delaware).
243
WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 88, at 23.
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es filed before a given judge in the last five years. As alternative measures
of “trial experience,” this study uses (1) the number of patent trials presided
over by the judge; and (2) the number of formal claim construction hearings
presided over by the judge.244 These results stem from the Lex Machina database by researching judges and matching their patent case, trial, and claim
construction experience from February 2014 through January 2019. Because all of these variables present similar patterns, for ease of analysis,
only the first measure is used in the regressions presented here. The analysis
also measures the number of years the judge has served on the bench since
their initial presidential appointment. Further, the study constructs a variable for whether the judge previously sat by designation at the CAFC with
the hypothesis that judges who previously sat by designation are less likely
to be reversed on appeal.245 Overall, 18% of the judges who have substantive patent cases heard on appeal previously served as visitors on the
CAFC.246
3. Other Independent Variables
This study collects information about the patent, including the patent
number and whether there are multiple patents asserted in the litigation. It
also notes the technological category of the patent. John R. Allison, Mark A.
Lemley, and Joshua Walker concluded that software-related patents are
among the most litigated patent types.247 For ease of analysis of the data
presented, cases are characterized according to one of the six National Bureau of Economic Research (“NBER”) categories: (1) chemical; (2) computer and communications; (3) drug and medical; (4) electronics and electrical; (5) mechanical; and (6) other, including design patents.248
In addition to using the technological category to classify patent types,
it is also important to assess the patent’s complexity. Judges in certain districts may hear cases involving more complex technology than are heard in
other districts, and as such, failure to control for complexity could obscure

244
Judges do not need to interpret the claims through a formal Markman hearing. They could
also interpret the claims in the context of deciding a motion such as a summary judgment motion.
245
See Lemley & Miller, supra note 159, at 466 (finding that judges who previously sat by
designation at the CAFC were 15% less likely to be reversed on an appeal, a statistically significant result).
246
See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, VISITING JUDGES (2015), http://
www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/judicial-reports/vjchartforwebsite2006-2015.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PG5W-UTZB] (listing visiting judges).
247
John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the MostLitigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 31 (2009).
248
See Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?, supra note 66, at 242 (positing that diverse case
characteristics “are not randomly distributed throughout the judicial districts”).

Boston College Law Review

564

[Vol. 60:519

the results because reversals may be more common in complex cases.249
Kesan and Ball coded for “the presence of a dissenting opinion,” reasoning
that “a dissent is a proxy for the complexity of the technology in issue(s)
. . . and . . . the difficulty of the decision.”250 Instead of the presence of a
dissent, this analysis codes for the number of entries on the district court
docket sheet, opining that more complex cases will have more entries on
their docket sheet. To better capture complexity, in other specifications not
reported here, the analysis notes how many citations each patent has to other patents and other non-patent literature, as well as the number of citations
other patents make to that specific patent, on the theory that patents of
greater economic consequence tend to get cited more and that more complex patents would have more citations.251
For each case, a variety of other data was collected relating to the litigants and the judges hearing the case at the district court and appellate level. The analysis accounts for the procedural posture of the case. Lemley and
Miller found higher reversal rates for appeals involving claim construction
than for cases involving summary judgment, a jury trial, or JMOL when
compared to the reference category of bench trials.252 For purposes of the
present analysis, consent judgments are coded as summary judgment motions, because in the patent realm, parties often stipulate to noninfringement when claim construction is the primary issue on appeal. In
addition, cases are coded on whether they are precedential as well as
whether they are resolved under Rule 36.
This study also analyzes information about the parties in the case, including whether the plaintiff filed multiple patent suits against other parties
signifying that they were a “high-volume” plaintiff.253 Overall, patent trolls,
or NPEs, may be more likely to be affirmed as they may be less risk adverse
and appeal more often.254 Also collected is information about the federal
249

Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 418–19.
See id. at 432 (discussing key variables).
251
See Allison et al., supra note 247, at 4–5, 14 (noting which patents are frequently cited).
252
Lemley & Miller, supra note 159, at 466 (noting, however, that these procedural results
were significant at 90% confidence).
253
This analysis assesses whether a plaintiff is a “high-volume” plaintiff by analyzing whether the same plaintiff filed other suits against the same or multiple defendants involving the same
patents from September 2011 through January 2019. If a plaintiff filed ten or more such suits, the
plaintiff is characterized as “high-volume.” Lex Machina also codes for “High-Volume Plaintiff”
to capture patentees who routinely file lawsuits. In alternative specifications, this analysis used the
Lex Machina measure as well as a combined measure using both criteria. Using the first-measure,
19% of appealed cases in the present analysis involve a “high-volume” plaintiff whereas 16% of
considered cases were “high-volume” using the second measure, with 28% of cases being highvolume using the third measure. This measure is more expansive than simply including patent
trolls. For instance, large pharmaceutical companies are considered “high-volume” plaintiffs.
254
Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 2117, 2163–65 (2013) (arguing that NPEs may express less anxiety about reputation and
250
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court judges and the CAFC panel, including the ideology of the judges as
represented by the party of the appointing president, whether they have a
scientific background, and their general judicial and patent experience.255
Judge Moore found that political ideology played little to no role in decision
making.256 Other scholars conclude that ideology is especially pertinent in
influencing decision making for specialized judges.257 Miller and Curry theorized that concerns related to patent rights mirror concerns about monopolies in general, with Democrats wanting to invalidate patents more frequently and Republicans desiring to preserve the property right.258 Each judge is
assigned an ideology score based on the party of the appointing president,
which is a common technique in judicial politics for the study of the federal
judiciary.259
Unobservable, non-random differences may exist among district courts
or between courts in the pilot program and those outside it.260 To control for
differences among districts, dummy variables are used per district.261 Some
district courts hear more cases than others.262 Kesan and Ball found that patent cases as a proportion of all civil cases ranged from a high of 6.75% in
Delaware to a low of almost zero in courts like the Southern District of
Mississippi.263 Additionally, other differences could exist between districts
in terms of how cases are managed or workload is allocated.264 Most of the
district level dummy variables are dropped because those variables often
appeal anyway); Shawn P. Miller, “Fuzzy” Software Patents Boundaries and High Claim Construction Reversal Rates, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 809, 830 (2014), http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/
fuzzysoftware.pdf [https://perma.cc/263C-732X].
255
Information on judges’ scientific backgrounds can be found by the using the Almanac of
the Federal Judiciary. Almanac of the Federal Judiciary, WOLTERS KLUWER (last visited Dec. 26,
2018), https://almanacofthefederaljudiciary.com/terms_condtions [https://perma.cc/R335-8BXB];
see, e.g., Shartzer, supra note 29, at 228 n.304 (using the Almanac for the same purpose).
256
Moore, supra note 22, at 27 & n.99 (finding no difference between Democratic and Republican judges in claim construction).
257
See, e.g., Golden, supra note 8, at 557 & n.22 (analyzing political ideology in the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit); Miller & Curry, supra note 34, at 857 (finding that differences that
exist in decision making in patent cases are correlated to judges’ perceived ideologies).
258
Miller & Curry, supra note 34, at 850 (construing differences between Democrats and
Republicans as based on economic philosophies).
259
Such scores are called “DW-NOMINATE” scores and were used to calculate the median
score for the CAFC panel. See DESCRIPTION OF NOMINATE DATA (July 13, 2004), http://k7moa.
com/page2a.htm [https://perma.cc/ZQX9-RRCL] (explaining types of “NOMINATE Coordinates”).
260
Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 425.
261
Alternative specifications are used to assess court congestion by using the weighted average of all case filings per judge, per Kesan and Ball. See id. at 424–25 (controlling for court congestion).
262
Id. at 424.
263
Id. Kesan and Ball found that “the number of patent cases per judge varie[s] from 17.61 in
[the District of] Delaware to 0.04 in [the District of] New Mexico.” Id.
264
Id. at 425 & n.192.
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perfectly predict the outcome of the case given that so many district judges
hear only one or two cases during the period under study. As such, the analysis included dummy variables only for the Eastern District of Texas, the
District of Delaware, and the Northern District of California. The lower
court decision is also controlled for because it may be more common to
simply affirm the lower court regardless of whether the lower court decision
is pro-patentee.
Alternative specifications not reported here used the variable “summary motion” to control for the degree of fact-finding by the lower court.
When the lower court rules on a motion for summary judgment or a motion
to dismiss on the pleadings, the court purportedly is only supposed to grant
the motion if no genuine disputes about any material facts exist or if the
party fails to state a case at the pleading stage.265 Miller and Curry found
that cases involving a summary motion had a 25% increased chance of the
CAFC invalidating the patent.266 Additionally, although the period of study
is fairly short, “a time-varying effect” could exist, as changes in the economy or national political events could impact decision making.267 Time was
measured by using year dummy variables for each year from 2011 to 2016
based on the filing date of the case as well as a time trend variable in alternative specifications.
The presented specification uses standard errors clustered by judge.268
Unobserved characteristics of a given judge that impact the analysis may be
left unmeasured by other variables. Some judges such as Judge Sue Robinson from Delaware or Judge James Rodney Gilstrap have more than twenty
cases heard on appeal. One might also expect correlation between cases
presided over by the same judge. In alternative specifications, standard errors were clustered at the case-level. However, less than 5% of the cases
involved appeals of different issues in the same case. Table 4 presents the
summary statistics.

265

See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (setting forth the standard for summary judgment).
Miller & Curry, supra note 34, at 857.
267
See Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 425 (considering influences that could result in “a timevarying effect”).
268
In alternative specifications, errors were clustered by court. Moreover, since judges are
nested within district courts, alternative models used a multilevel measure to assess the relationship.
266
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Select Variables, Substantive
Appealed Cases
Variable

Med.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Pilot Judge

0

0.41

0.49

0

1

Pilot District

1

0.60

0.49

0

1

Pilot Judge+DE

1

0.57

0.50

0

1

Median Cases

1

0.67

0.47

0

1

# Patent Cases

1,991

2,917.52

1,974.81

1

5,115

Tenure

3

4.99

6.17

0

50

Designated Judge

0

0.18

0.39

0

1

Docket

28

59.93

96.58

5

1,952

High-Volume P

0

0.39

0.49

0

1

Pleadings

0

0.22

0.41

0

1

Sum. Jud.

1

0.84

0.37

0

1

Bench Trial

0

0.12

0.33

0

1

Jury Trial/JMOL

0

0.13

0.33

0

1

PI

0

0.04

0.19

0

1

Claim

0

0.34

0.47

0

1

Infringe

0

0.14

0.35

0

1

Validity

1

0.57

0.50

0

1

Inequit. Cond.

0

0.02

0.15

0

1

Chemical

0

0.03

0.17

0

1

Computers

1

0.59

0.49

0

1

Drug

0

0.12

0.33

0

1

Electronics

0

0.08

0.28

0

1

Mechanical

0

0.07

0.25

0

1

Other Technology

0

0.11

0.31

0

1

Lower Court

0

0.48

0.50

0

1

Filing Year

2014

2013

0.145

2011

2016

CAFC Ideology

-0.48

-0.48

-0.48

-0.48

0.72
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C. The Statistical Models
1. Overview
The statistical model uses two approaches: logit regression analysis
and regression analysis after conducting propensity score matching. Because assortment into the pilot and non-pilot districts is not random, the results of any statistical analysis could be biased if not properly accounting
for the factors that influence the probability of being in or out of the “treatment” group. In regression analysis, despite attempts to “control” for factors
that may influence the propensity to be in one group or another, lingering
bias in the results may still exist. As such, to further buttress the robustness
of the analysis, in addition to using regression, a propensity score matching
is also used as an alternative measure. Propensity score matching seeks to
predict the probability of being in the treatment category, which here would
be having a case heard before a pilot judge. The first stage regression estimates the probability of receiving the treatment; that is, what factors influence the propensity to be in the “treatment” group before a pilot judge? After estimating that probability based on a propensity score, treatment and
control cases can be matched based on their propensity score so as to mimic
randomization through the creation of both a treatment and control group
that are comparable on all covariates except for the treatment (here, pilot
status).
An example illustrates the point. Suppose there are two cases involving invalidity on a chemical patent, with the only difference being that one
is heard before a pilot judge and the other before a non-pilot judge. Those
cases are “matched” so that they would be comparable on all relevant covariates except for the treatment category. Doing the analysis in this way
overcomes some of the causality issues that occur when, as here, the treatment (being in the pilot program) is not a random occurrence.269
2. Results
Moving to test the hypotheses, a logit regression model is employed
first to estimate the impact that inclusion in the pilot program has on whether the decision of the judge in question is overturned in full or in part on
appeal. Logit models estimate the impact of a given variable on the probability that a given event will occur. If the coefficient on the variable is positive, then the probability of the event occurring increases whereas if the

269

An instrumental variable approach can also be used to combat some of the causality issues.
It is difficult, however, to find an instrument to explain the treatment (for example, being in the
pilot program) that would not otherwise influence the result (for example, being overruled).
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event is negative, then the probability of a reversal, either in whole or in
part, decreases. The equation is as follows:
Pr(Overulei = 1) = Φ (α0 + β1Specialized Courti + β2CaseCharacteristicsi +
β3Judge Characteristicsi + λ Other Controlsi)
Table 5 gives the results when the impact is measured across legal issues
where there is a complete reversal. The variable of interest—specialized
judge—is measured in a few different ways as discussed in Section B.270
This variable does not reach statistical significance for any construction of
the dependent variable. Variables directed at the number of patent cases
filed before that particular judge—or alternatively, in other specifications,
number of trials, or the number of claim construction hearings—also do not
affect the outcome. However, judges with more experience are more likely
to be overruled, though the effect is small and barely statistically significant. For each additional ten years on the bench, the judge has a 5% greater
chance of being overruled.
Interestingly, the results indicate to a statistically significant degree
that district court judges who previously served as designated judges on the
CAFC are 11% less likely to have their cases reversed on appeal holding all
other variables at their median. This is a stunning result which suggests that
Lemley and Miller’s findings to that effect extend beyond claim construction decisions.271
Other variables reach statistical significance at conventional levels of
95% confidence. Holding other variables at their median, a case with the
main issue being claim construction has an 9% greater chance of being
overruled whereas cases involving high-volume plaintiffs are 17% more
likely to be reversed in full. In addition, the CAFC is 8% more likely to reverse in full when issuing a precedential opinion. It is also 12% less likely
to reverse in infringement cases, owing perhaps to the large number of noninfringement cases that are affirmed on appeal under Rule 36. Other variables such as the most of the technological categories (except mechanical)
and variables dealing with the procedural posture of the case are not significant. Since nearly 75% of CAFC panels during this period have a liberal
median ideology score owing to so many CAFC judges being appointed by
Democratic presidents, it is of no surprise that the ideology variable is not
significant here. Judges from Delaware are 11% more likely to be reversed
in full.
270

See supra notes 231–268.
See Lemley & Miller, supra note 159, at 460 (finding lower reversal rates for judges who
have sat by designation at the CAFC). Appealed cases in which a Federal Circuit judge sat by
designation on the lower court are eliminated.
271
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Table 5: Logit Estimation of Likelihood of CAFC Overruling
Decision in Full
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Pilot

Pilot Dist.

Pilot+DE

Median

Specialized

-0.118
(0.462)

-0.081
(0.456)

-0.118
(0.462)

-0.168
(0.442)

Patent Cases

-0.0001
(0.0002)

-0.0001
(0.0002)

-0.0001
(0.0002)

-0.0001
(0.0002)

Tenure

0.046*
(0.019)

0.046*
(0.020)

0.046*
(0.019)

0.048**
(0.018)

Designated

-1.019*
(0.470)

-1.027*
(0.467)

-1.019*
(0.470)

-1.005*
(0.480)

Docket

0.001
(0.0008)

0.001
(0.0008)

0.001
(0.0008)

0.001
(0.0008)

Claim

0.843*
(0.369)

0.844*
(0.371)

0.843*
(0.369)

0.856*
(0.382)

High-Vol.

1.574***
(0.385)

1.570***
(0.386)

1.574***
(0.385)

1.600***
(0.384)

Infringe

-1.130**
(0.424)

-1.121**
(0.426)

-1.130**
(0.424)

-1.114**
(0.432)

Validity

-0.387
(0.378)

-0.379
(0.377)

-0.387
(0.378)

-0.370
(0.374)

Inequ. Cond.

0.276
(1.160)

0.275
(1.154)

0.276
(1.160)

0.247
(1.161)

Precedent

0.780*
(0.370)

0.780*
(0.371)

0.780*
(0.370)

0.774*
(0.376)

Procedural

Included

Included

Included

Included

Lower Ct.

Included

Included

Included

Included

Technology

Included

Included

Included

Included

Ideology

Included

Included

Included

Included

District Ct.

Included

Included

Included

Included

Year
_cons

Included
Included
Included
Included
-2.953***
-2.965***
-2.956***
-2.965***
(0.765)
(0.831)
(0.765)
(0.778)
434
434
434
434
N
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by judge. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 6 shows the results broken down by partial reversals. The results
are similar to those displayed in Table 5, with neither the pilot variables nor
the patent experience variables reaching statistical significance. The effect
of having served as a designated judge is enhanced; judges who previously
sat by designation had a 15% decreased likelihood of being reversed in part.
As with the analysis involving full reversals, holding other variables at their
median results in a 14% increased likelihood of reversal in part for cases
involving claim construction. High-volume plaintiffs and precedential cases
both have about 17-18% increased likelihood of being reversed in part, with
other variables at their median. Judges who served longer are 5% more likely to be reversed in part with ten additional years of service.
The results on partial reversals display some differences from total reversals. Unlike the analysis for full reversals, the infringement variable is
not significant but those seeking summary judgment have a 14% decreased
chance of being reversed in part holding other variables at their median.
More complex cases, as measured by the number of docket entries, have a
3% increased chance of getting reversed in part with an additional onehundred pages added to the docket sheet. Like the analysis involving full
reversals, neither the technological or most of the procedural variables are
statistically significant. Nonetheless, as shown in the statistical results, little
difference exists in appellate court treatment based on the specialization of
the judge. This specification is robust to alternative codings of some of the
variables and to different ways of clustering the standard errors. Alternative
specifications are listed in the online appendix, which also provides a fuller
treatment of each table.272

272
For more information on additional specifications and to see each table in full, see the
online Appendix, supra note 229.
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Table 6: Logit Estimation of Likelihood of CAFC
Overruling Decision in Part
Model 1
Pilot

Model 2
Pilot Dist.

Model 3
DE+Pilot

Model 4
Median

Specialized

-0.257
(0.389)

-0.110
(0.370)

-0.257
(0.389)

-0.141
(0.352)

Patent Cases

0.00002
(0.0002)

-0.00006
(0.0002)

0.00002
(0.0002)

0.000007
(0.0002)

Tenure

0.033*
(0.016)

0.033*
(0.017)

0.033*
(0.016)

0.034*
(0.016)

Designated

-1.044**
(0.357)

-1.064**
(0.355)

-1.044**
(0.357)

-1.048**
(0.356)

Docket

0.002***
(0.0006)

0.002***
(0.0006)

0.002***
(0.0006)

0.002***
(0.0006)

Claim

0.964**
(0.325)

0.960**
(0.327)

0.964**
(0.325)

0.969**
(0.332)

High-Vol.

1.296**
(0.408)

1.283**
(0.407)

1.296**
(0.408)

1.307**
(0.407)

Infringe

-0.594
(0.328)

-0.577
(0.333)

-0.594
(0.328)

-0.575
(0.332)

Validity

0.011
(0.352)

0.024
(0.351)

0.011
(0.352)

0.028
(0.349)

Inequ. Cond.

0.178
(1.178)

0.183
(1.165)

0.178
(1.178)

0.172
(1.162)

Precedent

1.236***
(0.260)

1.244***
(0.261)

1.236***
(0.260)

1.245***
(0.261)

Procedural

Included

Included

Included

Included

Lower Ct.

Included

Included

Included

Included

Technology

Included

Included

Included

Included

Ideology

Included

Included

Included

Included

District Ct.

Included

Included

Included

Included

Year
_cons

Included
Included
Included
Included
-2.074**
-2.061**
-2.100**
-2.061**
(0.701)
(0.723)
(0.701)
(0.703)
434
434
434
434
N
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by judge. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Next, the study considers the results using the propensity score method. To do this analysis, first the propensity to be included in the pilot
group is estimated using many of the same independent variables discussed
in Section B to predict whether a case would be considered part of the
“treatment.” Based on the qualitative analysis previously discussed, several
factors suggest a greater proclivity to be included in a pilot district.274 Figure 9 displays the results by calculating the standardized percentage bias
across covariates. Symbols marked by a black circle represent the values for
the treatment category, in this case, being a pilot judge. Symbols marked by
an “x” show the values after the matching, and ideally one wants to get as
close as possible to the “0” line so as to minimize the bias across covariates.
Not surprisingly, cases concerning computers and communications are more
likely to be heard in a pilot district as are cases with longer docket sheets,
indicating more complexity as well as cases involving high-volume plaintiffs. Pilot judges also have more trial experience. Case disposition could
also affect the chance of being in a pilot group as dismissals are less common and trials and cases concerning claim construction are more common
in the pilot group. After matching, there is no statistically significant effect
of pilot status on cases being overruled in full or in part.
273

Figure 9

273
274

For details on the propensity score method, see id.
See supra notes 162–177 and accompanying text.
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3. Limitations from Statistical Studies
As with any statistical analysis, limitations exist in the data study. Any
study of judicial decision making is necessarily influenced by other factors
that may not be controlled for in the analysis. It is hard to tell whether the
measure of specialization is the right one. Perhaps the most experienced
judges are not showing up as “experienced” in the database because specialized judges are so versed in patent law that they have a special knack for
encouraging settlements. In turn, a better method could exist for analyzing
case complexity—the variable that would likely be the key confounding
variable in this analysis in addition to the selection effect issue. Moreover,
an analysis should account for the interaction between specialization and
issue type.275 Technical expertise could also vary by case; judges with
chemistry backgrounds would find them of little relevance if the invention
concerns computers.276 The analysis also does not account for the fact that a
judge’s law clerk may have scientific skills that could influence how the
judge decides a given case.277
The findings are sensitive to other variations in coding. Unless it is
made explicit, for instance, how do we tell that the trial court’s invalidity
ruling rests on a claim construction analysis if the CAFC summarily affirms
the decision? This problem is especially acute when the CAFC decides a
case by a Rule 36 opinion. The present analysis looks at the lower court’s
decision to resolve this dilemma when it comes up, but it is impossible to
determine on what basis the CAFC affirms when it does not issue a written
opinion.278
Moreover, the results depend on the issue actually appealed, and in
some cases the CAFC may not resolve an issue if it is moot. For instance,
the trial court may find that a patent is both invalid and not infringed. The
CAFC’s decision, however, may discuss only infringement, because if that
issue is resolved in the competitor’s favor, then the court need not rule on
the merits of any affirmative defense, like invalidity or inequitable conduct.
275

Although this study added in a judge’s “scientific” background in some specifications, the
measure was dropped since so few district judges graduated with a bachelors degree in science or
worked in the scientific field. Moreover, such a measure is necessarily crude, as a judge’s undergraduate or graduate training in a science discipline may not be a reflection of scientific
knowledge, and those with significant scientific expertise could be “hidden from view” when
education is used as the sole metric. See Lemley et al., supra note 16, at 1153 (considering how to
“measure expertise”).
276
See id. (discussing the shortcomings of educational background as the measurement of
expertise).
277
See Shartzer, supra note 29, at 230 (explaining the proliferation of technical law clerks).
278
See David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1073, 1095
n.146 (2010) (discussing the challenges with understanding the CAFC’s basis for Rule 36 affirmances).
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The CAFC may equally disagree with the invalidity decision, but because
the issue is moot, it is not resolved, and thus the database would not include
it.
Additionally, a pressing issue is how to measure the dependent variable. By centering the dependent variable around the CAFC decision, the
analysis implicitly makes the assumption that the CAFC decision is the
“correct” one. Whether this assumption holds up empirically is up for debate, as the CAFC may not necessarily make more “correct” decisions than
the lower court. Further analysis could look at alternative dependent variables such as time to disposition so as to measure whether pilot judges may
be more efficient in their decision making.
Selection effects may also be at work, presenting the most concerning
methodological difficulty in analyzing the workings of the pilot program.
Patent case filings across various district courts are not a random sample,
and as an element of trial strategy, a litigant may file in one district over
another.279 Parties may engage in judge shopping.280 Some districts, like the
Eastern District of Texas, facilitate this practice by letting parties essentially
choose their judge by deciding in which division within the district to file,
which could impact the results.281 Indeed, the Eastern District of Texas has
continued this practice even though the rules of the pilot program officially
provide for random assignment.282 In any event, the nature of the pilot program assignment process makes it so that litigants know with at least a onethird chance who will be their judge in some districts.283
Appealed cases are also not representative and are more likely to be
considered close cases.284 The type of litigant may correlate with the propensity to appeal.285 As Schwartz notes, generic pharmaceutical companies
“may be more likely to appeal” due to the high stakes involved.286 Patent
trolls may also approach litigation differently.287 Furthermore, the choice of
whether to appeal is endogenous; in deciding whether to appeal, litigants

279

Shartzer, supra note 29, at 228.
See Klerman & Reilly, supra note 83, at 254–55 (discussing how the pilot program still
results in “[j]udge [s]hopping”).
281
Id. at 255.
282
Id. at 256.
283
Id. at 255.
284
Moore, supra note 22, at 9–10.
285
Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?, supra note 66, at 242.
286
Id.
287
Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz, Heterogeneity Among Patent
Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of a Patent Case Progression, Settlement, and Adjudication, 15
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 80, 116–17 (2018) (explaining how patent trolls litigate differently
than other entities and even how different types of patent trolls operate differently from one another).
280
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may consider the reputation and expertise of the trial court judge.288 Thus,
sorting out the direction of causation can be difficult.
Inconsistent joinder of parties could also bias the results. Historically,
the Eastern District of Texas has interpreted loosely the joinder rules, allowing parties to sue multiple defendants in the same suit.289 In other districts,
however, the same type of suit would be considered multiple lawsuits instead of one joint one.290 In recent years, Congress sought to address this
issue through the America Invents Act (“AIA”) and the CAFC has tried to
deal with the issue to little avail as the Eastern District of Texas simply altered the way it consolidated cases.291 Additionally, the Eastern District of
Texas also has a habit of allowing multiple defendants to be tried in the
same trial.292 In 2015, Congress altered the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in an attempt to reduce the number of defendants sued by patent trolls.293
These practices wreak havoc on any statistical model trying to predict behavior because we are comparing apples to oranges with the Eastern District of Texas’s disparate practices. The results are the same whether the
Eastern District of Texas is included in the analysis, but nonetheless, less
obvious practices between courts could impact the results.
Moreover, the procedural posture of the case could influence the propensity for the parties to settle. Defendant-patentees who are sued in declaratory judgment actions and parties who hold license agreements may be
more willing to settle because they do not want to risk having their patents
being invalidated.294 We also cannot underestimate the extent to which public opinion and the status of the litigants in the wider society could influence results as well. Some patents are more societally useful than others and
public opinion about a case could conceivably affect how courts rule. A case
involving the Apple iPhone could implicate societal and public opinion
concerns not present for other run of the mill patent cases on inventions not
widely used.

288

Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?, supra note 66, at 242–43.
Klerman & Reilly, supra note 83, at 258.
290
See id. (comparing number of defendants in patent cases in different districts)
291
Id. at 258–59.
292
Id. at 259.
293
Matthew Bultman, Stricter Patent Pleading Requirements Take Effect Dec. 1, LAW360
(Nov. 30, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/717900 [https://perma.cc/2KUM-CJRW]. The
2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure changed the pleading model that had
allowed patentees to file complaints by simply listing the “name and number of the patent and an
allegation of infringement.” Id.; see Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff Pending
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant Composition of the
Federal Rulemaking Committees, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1125–29 (2015) (critiquing changes to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 84 and the abolishment of forms).
294
Shartzer, supra note 29, at 229.
289
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Further, the CAFC’s inconsistent claim construction jurisprudence
could cloud any statistical analysis.295 It is no secret among patent practitioners that panels on the CAFC have at least two divergent approaches to
claim construction, and that they use these approaches “interchangeably.”296
High reversal rates or failure to find a statistically significant result could be
as much about what panel at the CAFC hears the case as the experience of
the pilot judge.297 Although the present analysis expands beyond claim construction, understanding the claims is key in any infringement or validity
analysis. To the extent district court judges are not given consistent guidance, it is difficult to assess accurately how reversal rates may change with
the pilot program.
Some of these concerns may be overblown. Patent law is different than
other litigation in terms of the stakes involved, so the selection effects
measured by appeal rate may not be as worrisome. The American Intellectual Property Law Association estimates that an individual patent lawsuit
can cost upwards of three million dollars through the close of discovery
when more than twenty-five million dollars is at risk.298 Such high stakes
encourage parties to appeal no matter the circumstance or the identity of the
judge or panel hearing the case.299 Moreover, the de novo nature of appellate review increases the propensity to appeal.300 Although statistical analysis can try to deal with some of these concerns, recognition of the limits of
statistical analysis to conclusively explain decision making is important in
discerning how well the pilot program is working.

295
See Etan S. Chatlynne, On Measuring the Expertise of Patent-Pilot Judges: Encouraging
Enhancement of Claim-Construction Uniformity, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 309,
313 (2013) (testing whether the pilot program’s reduction in reversal rates could be “difficult”
given the CAFC’s inconsistent claim construction jurisprudence).
296
Id. at 310; see Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 67, at 1111 (observing two judicial
theories on claim construction).
297
Chatlynne, supra note 295, at 321 (noting how “claim-construction reversal rates may be
an erroneous indicator of success”).
298
AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, 2015 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 37
(2015) [hereinafter AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N]. The American Intellectual Property
Law Association notes that patent suits can cost two million dollars when between one million
dollars and ten million dollars is at stake, and as much as five million dollars when more than ten
million dollars is at stake. Id.; see Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation,
55 B.C. L. REV. 1443, 1483–84 (2014) (exploring the exorbitant costs associated with patent litigation as opposed to other types of civil litigation).
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Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?, supra note 66, at 244.
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V. DISCUSSION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
As companies increasingly rely on intellectual property assets as a
source of revenue and strategic advantage, it is clear that we need to do
more to resolve the levels of unpredictability and inaccuracy in the current
system.301 Patent litigation is in a rapid ascent and costs of litigation are sky
high.302 Though the patent law pilot program represents a sound attempt to
achieve greater predictability and uniformity, so far, as this study indicates,
it is only a first step at best in reducing errors on appeal.
Despite the clear benefits brought about by specialization, the results
of the pilot program five years out indicate that—at least as measured by
reversal rates—specialized trial court tribunals are not offering a greater
benefit to litigants than generalist ones. This realization should not close the
door for the patent pilot project; indeed, some of the results are promising,
suggesting ways in which the program could be adjusted to achieve its goals
more expeditiously. In recent years, some districts, like the Southern District of Florida, have exited from participating, finding that the program
does not foster the benefits touted.303 Importantly, the FJC’s five-year report
echoes the findings of the present analysis concerning the limited influence
of the pilot program.304 But, there are ways to reform the program and the
legal system for patents so as to achieve the pilot program’s goals. These
reforms include the following: (1) altering the system to provide resources
to individual judges irrespective of the district in which they sit; (2) reforming patent law internally by focusing on rules and internal USPTO practices; and (3) readjusting the system to give the USPTO more responsibility to
make decisions on patent law.

301
See Shartzer, supra note 29, at 209 (discussing the economic importance of patents). Indeed, some companies like IBM rely extensively on patent rights for revenue. Id. As of 2006, IBM
generated over one billion dollars in revenue yearly from patents alone. Id. As another example of
the lucrativeness of patents, in 2010, an Apple-led group bought several Nortel patents for fourand-a -half billion dollars. See Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Consortium Led by Apple Buys Nortel’s Patents for $4.5 Billion, FORTUNE (July 1, 2011), http://fortune.com/2011/07/01/consortium-led-byapple-buys-nortels-patents-for-4-5-billion/ [https://perma.cc/F9G6-HMSZ] (explaining the buying
and selling of patents).
302
Shartzer, supra note 29, at 210–11. Between 2000 and 2007, patent litigation increased
nearly 20%. Id. at 210. A patent worth more than twenty-five million dollars can cost millions to
litigate with litigation costs rising over 67% between 2001 and 2007, a figure that far outpaces the
rate of inflation. Id. at 211.
303
See Patent Pilot Program in the Southern District of Florida Scrubbed, supra note 178
(pontificating on the Southern District of Florida’s withdrawal from the pilot program).
304
See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 88, at 39 (discussing the findings as they currently stand
and indicating the need for future research).
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A. Reform of the Patent Pilot Program
A specialized patent judiciary may work but either the wrong judges
are included in the current program or the current judges need more time to
gain the necessary experience for the pilot program to bear fruit. Some district courts, such as the Eastern District of Virginia or the District of Delaware, have developed national reputations in patent law, and so their exclusion from the pilot program is puzzling.305 Moreover, some district courts
have developed regional expertise. According to the present analysis, Judge
T.S. Ellis in the Eastern District of Virginia or Judge Nathaniel Gorton in
the District of Massachusetts hear many patent cases. Also, the pilot program may simply be allocating resources to the wrong judges, relying on
district court numbers of patent litigation rather than looking at which individual judges are actually developing expertise in patent law. Indeed, the
initial bill authorizing the patent pilot program excludes about 85% of district court judges from participating, including all district court judges within the Fourth and Tenth Circuits.306 A glaring omission is the District of
Delaware, which is precluded from participating because it lacks the minimum ten judgeships per program rules.307
A finer-grained understanding of legal issues would assess where specialized courts help and where they do not. Schwartz found that over a
longer period of time, compared to the present study, at least one de facto
semi-specialized district court—the District of Delaware—had lower reversal rates than other districts.308 But, it took Delaware many years for its
judges to gain expertise. Regardless, reversal rates are heavily dependent on
the case facts themselves. In order for the patent pilot program to work,
more time must be afforded for judges to fully understand the intricacies of
patent law. As Shartzer finds and the present results confirm, on an individual basis, the CAFC hears only a few cases each year, even those of judges
participating in the pilot program, thereby reducing the opportunity for
judges to get appropriate feedback from the CAFC.309 The pilot program
may simply need more time to work.
It is also not clear which barometer should be used to measure “success.” Pilot judges may be more efficient, but studies conducted over a
305

See Leychkis, supra note 77, at 202, 210 (describing reputations of the Eastern District of
Virginia and the District of Delaware).
306
Olson, supra note 132, at 758. Moreover, the law requires that at least six district courts
participate and that the districts are spread out among at least three different circuits. Act of Jan. 4,
2011, Pub. L. No. 111-349, § 1(b)(1), 124 Stat. 3674, 3674 (2011).
307
Olson, supra note 132, at 760.
308
Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?, supra note 66, at 283.
309
See Shartzer, supra note 29, at 233 (predicting that each judge participating in the pilot
program “can expect to receive approximately two decisions per year from the [CAFC]”).
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longer period of time and with a larger data set could show more differences
across issue types. Another problem may be that the pilot program improperly equates experience with expertise whereas these concepts are distinct
analytically.310 Quite possibly, the pilot program is helping judges gain
more experience, but what the system really needs is judicial decision makers with greater expertise in the scientific fields at issue. Indeed, since the
inception of the pilot program, only about 5% of all patent cases appointed
a special masters or technical assistant, with 83% of those appointments
occurring before pilot judges and most taking place in the Eastern District
of Texas.311 There is always a chance that reliance on a technical expert or
technical law clerk means that the judge depends on that expert to the detriment of the case. But, because lay judges often lack the technical knowhow to understand complex technologies without expert assistance, adding
more resources to aid in that understanding may help the pilot better
achieve its goals.312 Alternatively, segregating cases by the judge’s scientific
subject matter expertise is also an option.
Further, a panel of judges in the Northern District of Illinois discussing
the pilot program was asked whether they believed that reversal rates are a
good indicator of success.313 They argued that the issue of reversal rates had
more to do with the CAFC than them.314 As one judge noted, the problem
had to do with the unwillingness of the CAFC to defer to the lower courts,
especially on issues like claim construction.315 One judge speaking about
the pilot program opined that a better measure of success than reversal rates
is talking with lawyers about their experiences before particular judges.316
Indeed, instead of trying to work within the confines of the current judicial machinery, perhaps the time is ripe to consider more radical alternatives, like creating a national-level specialized trial court akin to the U.S.
Tax Court, a specialized tax tribunal located in Washington, D.C. whose
judges “ride circuit” to hear cases regionally.317 Such an approach is not
310

Miller & Curry, supra note 34, at 858.
WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 88, at 26.
312
See Olson, supra note 132, at 763–64, 769 (discussing the pitfalls of technical law clerks,
one of the resources funded by the patent pilot program). Olson notes that the use of technical
patent experts could also influence the clerks. Id. at 764.
313
Patent Pilot Program Perspectives, supra note 193, at 358.
314
Id. at 358–59.
315
Id. at 358.
316
Id. at 359.
317
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7441, 7443 (2018) (establishing the U.S. Tax Court and its operations).
Although the Tax Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts, “approximately 90%
of tax cases . . . are brought in the Tax Court.” John B. Pegram, Should the U.S. Court of International Trade Be Given Patent Jurisdiction Concurrent with That of the District Courts?, 32 HOUS.
L. REV. 67, 94 (1995) [hereinafter, Pegram, Should the U.S. Court of International Trade Be Given Patent Jurisdiction?].
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new in American law; in addition to the Tax Court, the Court of International Trade (“CIT”) and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims also provide specialized trial-level jurisprudence.318 Alternatively, a move to an adjudicatory
system might also be desirable.319
This move toward specialized trial courts would follow the lead of
countries like England that have created a separate patent law trial court.320
England has both a Patents Court and a Patents County Court—a newer
patent-focused trial court with concurrent jurisdiction that has reduced wait
times since its onset.321 Germany’s system authorizes certain district courts
with “judges . . . experienced in intellectual property matters” to hear patent
cases.322 These courts are known for their speed, often resolving cases in
under a year.323
In particular, it may be desirable to give greater jurisdiction to the
USITC to resolve patent cases.324 Presently, USITC hears patent cases when
a party files a complaint against a trade involving a patent infringement.325
Winning in the USITC excludes the product from being imported into the
United States and results in an order to cease and desist the infringing activity.326 The USITC is a desirable alternative for patent cases because it lacks
a criminal and tort docket and is designated as an Article III court—an important attribute to consider because patent litigants have a right to a jury
trial.327
Further analysis is needed to assess whether the program has had the
intended effect of reducing forum shopping. The FJC reports that four pilot
districts—the Eastern District of Texas and the Central, Northern, and
318

Pegram, Should the U.S. Court of International Trade Be Given Patent Jurisdiction?,
supra note 317, at 91. “The Court of Federal Claims has original jurisdiction over a variety of
claims against the United States for [monetary] compensation . . . .” Id. at 93.
319
See id. at 95–96 (discussing current adjudicatory systems).
320
See Thomas K. McBride, Jr., Patent Practice in London—Local Internationalism: How
Patent Law Magnifies the Relationship of the United Kingdom with Europe, the United States, and
the Rest of the World, 2 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 31, 48 (2004) (discussing the creation of the
specialized patent trial court known as the Patents County Court).
321
Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court?, supra note 51, at 774–75; Olson, supra note
132, at 750.
322
Olson, supra note 132, at 750.
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See Olson, supra note 132, at 750 (noting that Germany’s specialized system adjudicates
patent cases “within one year”); Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court?, supra note 51, at
775 (noting that in the British Patents County Court, “the average length of a trial is twelve hours,
or two and a half days”).
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Pegram, Should the U.S. Court of International Trade Be Given Patent Jurisdiction?,
supra note 317, at 71–72; Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court?, supra note 51, at 782.
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Pegram, Should the U.S. Court of International Trade Be Given Patent Jurisdiction?,
supra note 317, at 74.
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Id. Monetary damages are not awarded. Id.
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Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court?, supra note 51, at 782–83.
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Southern Districts of California—all saw greater patent filings relative to
civil case filings.328 The results thus far do not suggest that the pilot program has reduced forum shopping.329 Some notable districts, such as the
Eastern District of Virginia and the Western District of Wisconsin, are popularly known as “rocket dockets” due to their speed and efficiency in resolving all cases, not just patent ones.330 Thus, litigants still have an incentive to
file in those districts. Moreover, some districts, such as the Eastern District
of Texas, have a reputation for being pro-patentee due to the series of local
rules they have adopted.331 In the Eastern District of Texas, for instance,
now retired Judge T. John Ward required parties to turn over discovery at
the onset, sanctioning them if they failed to comply.332 Moreover, he required both parties to come up with a list of agreed upon claim terms, thus
narrowing the number of terms in dispute.333 The pilot program could fix
this problem of inconsistent rules by requiring districts subscribing to the
program to adhere to universal local patent rules. Further, some pilot program districts have a greater percentage of their judges participating in the
program than other pilot program districts. Thus, litigants know a priori that
in some districts there is very high chance of getting a pilot judge whereas
in other districts the odds are much lower due to the smaller percentage of
pilot judges per total number of district judges.334 Additionally, nothing in
the law actually requires litigants to file in any particular forum, and so it
appears, at least on first blush, that the pilot program has not mitigated forum shopping as much as intended. But, simple reforms could help alleviate
the problem.
In addition to requiring nationwide, uniform patent rules, recent developments in patent law jurisprudence may help alleviate forum shopping
concerns irrespective of any pilot program. In 2017, in T.C. Heartland LLC
v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, the Supreme Court narrowed how the
patent venue statute should be read, holding that a domestic corporation
only “resides” in its state of incorporation.335 Prior to the decision, a plaintiff could sue in any district where an infringing product was sold, making it
328

WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 88, at 37.
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effect on forum shopping).
330
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decide patent cases. Id. at 9 n.5.
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easy for almost any plaintiff to sue in the patentee-friendly Eastern District
of Texas.336 In interpreting the Supreme Court’s decision, in September
2017, the CAFC further narrowed the Eastern District of Texas’s interpretation of the venue provisions, requiring a tightly-linked physical nexus in
order for a party to sue in that district.337 The T.C. Heartland decision and
the subsequent CAFC decision may do more to alter plaintiff filing behavior
and have more of an impact on alleviating forum shopping—if interpreted
strictly—than any pilot program. “In the immediate aftermath of the [T.C.
Heartland] decision, filings in the Eastern District of Texas . . . decreased,
but filings in the District of Delaware . . . increased,” resulting in 40% of all
patent filings remaining in those two districts—the same percentage as before the Supreme Court’s decision.338
B. Reforming Patent Law Internally
Patent law—and its emphasis on interpreting the patent’s claims—
may be too indeterminate for proper resolution because little common understanding of claim terms exists through either definitional or legal standards.339 Patent office rules have not kept up with modern times as the
USPTO requires that claims be drafted within “a single sentence, regardless
of the number of clauses or concepts.”340 Courts are required to interpret the
claims as “one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.”341 But, because the
judge is often a person who is not of ordinary skill in the art, claim construction amounts to an impossible task.342
As such, if the system continues to rely on generalist judges to decide
patent cases, more resources should be added at the trial court level to aid in
interpretation. The federal judiciary could follow the lead of other countries,
such as Japan, and set up blue-ribbon panels composed of university researchers and experts from the private sector to advise on cases.343 Specialized intellectual property divisions of the trial courts in Tokyo and Osaka
336
See id. (rejecting a broader definition of jurisdiction for “a patent infringement lawsuit
against a corporation”).
337
See In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d. 1355, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (requiring a defendant to
have “a regular and established place of business” in the district in which the case is filed).
338
Cohen et al., supra note 18, at 1779 & n.24. Because T.C. Heartland introduces a new
complication to the data, this study does not include any district court decisions that were decided
after this decision. Coincidentally, because this study only considers the first five years of the pilot
program, the database cuts off before this decision was issued.
339
See Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?, supra note 66, at 260.
340
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341
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See id. at 259–60 (discussing the enormous challenges for district court judges in claim
construction).
343
Shartzer, supra note 29, at 203–04.

Boston College Law Review

584

[Vol. 60:519

now hear more than three-quarters of patent cases in Japan. 344 Technical
assistants, akin to USPTO examiners, aid judges in deciding cases.345 For
instance, to aid judges in understanding complex technology, the Japanese
Intellectual Property High Court, the appellate body similar to the CAFC,
created an “Expert Commissioner System” that includes “over 140 researchers and experts” from academia and both the public and private sectors.346
The USPTO can play its part in reforming the system by encouraging
or even requiring patentees to provide more real-world guidance on the content of the patent claims and what the actual invention entails in plain English. Further, with the rise of technology, perhaps the time is ripe to start
thinking of alternative ways to supplement the record to identify what the
invention covers, how it differs from the prior art, and what it actually does.
Video of how an invention works in practice could be considered part of the
record as a supplement to the plain meaning of the words to aid in interpreting what the patent covers.
The problem also lies in part with the CAFC. It has “near-total authority” over how patent policy is implemented in this country, in contrast to
appellate jurisdiction in most other areas of law, where cases are heard in
dispersed, regional appellate courts.347 As Jonathan S. Masur notes, the
CAFC:
[H]as been roundly criticized for promulgating overly formalistic
doctrines that ignore pragmatic considerations, tolerating uncertainty and confusion on key points of law, enhancing the power of
patent holders to the point of diminishing innovation, and failing
to distinguish technological fields in which patents are necessary
from those in which they are not.348
In fact, scholars predicted that the pilot program would not be a success
because the CAFC’s jurisprudence lacks consistency.349 R. Polk Wagner and
Lee Petherbridge contend that CAFC claim construction is “paneldependent” as their empirical analysis reveals that the CAFC has two different modes of claim construction.350 This heavy panel-dependent nature of
claim construction jurisprudence at the CAFC may lead to less stability and
344
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clarity of jurisprudence for lower courts to apply. Moreover, whatever consistent precedent the CAFC does come up with may not be translated to the
lower courts in an optimal matter, as the CAFC may do a poor job of translating precedent into workable principles for district courts to apply.351 Indeed, district judges bemoan that they do not receive any “real guidance”
from the CAFC.352 The CAFC could do more to strengthen the currently
tenuous connection between formation of precedent and its application by
adopting more supervision over the lower courts. As Rochelle Dreyfuss argues, the CAFC could engage in a more in-depth assessment of a district’s
court fact-finding, better oversee lower court judges, and hear more interlocutory appeals.353 Moreover, express recognition of the factual underpinnings of claim construction could lower the high reversal rate by the CAFC
irrespective of specialized courts.354
C. Administrative Reform
Finally, the solution may lie in changing the focus of the entire system
to leverage administrative expertise in deciding patent cases. Unlike other
areas of law, like torts, in which legislatures are very active, patent law is
characterized by an “overmatched judiciary and an absent legislature.”355
Reform of the patent system must be multi-institutional, focusing on the
role that Congress, the administrative bureaucracy, and the courts play in
implementing policy. The current system puts too much power in the hands
of the CAFC as a promulgator of policy by not installing inferior institutions, such as the USPTO and the lower federal courts, while not providing
the CAFC with the adequate support necessary for it to actually formulate
policy.356
The current patent system gives too much judicial discretion to courts,
allowing them to run rampant in crafting legal doctrine. Some argue that
complexity in patent law is no different than in other fields.357 Even the Supreme Court has hinted that it prefers that patent law not be treated differ351
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ently, but the question remains why patent law is different than other fields
of law, like environmental law, where a federal administrative agency has
plenary authority.358 Unlike areas of law, such as securities, pharmaceuticals, transportation, and environmental, patent law remains an outlier in that
it is a “highly technically complex regulatory field controlled entirely by
courts.”359 Masur argues that the time has come to bring patent law’s institutional arrangements in line with the rest of the administrative state by, inter
alia, empowering the USPTO with greater rulemaking authority.360
Courts—even specialized courts—may simply find themselves poorly
equipped to understand deeply the intricacies of patent law and its application to new and emerging technologies. Scientifically untrained judges and
their law clerks may lack the institutional and technical capability to weigh
whether an invention is obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art.361 Patent law involves two layers of technical competence: considering the economic consequences of setting the rule and an application of the rule to the
technical facts of a case.362 Specialized trial courts do not solve either problem; decision makers in these courts do not apply the right rule, or lack the
technical competence to devise the rule in the first place.363 Thus, instead of
relying on the federal courts to decipher legal rules for patent cases, the task
could instead be given to the very experts for whom the taxpayers pay to
oversee the patent system: the USPTO or another administrative agency
suitable for the job.364
Patent law is different statutorily from other fields where courts can effectively implement policy. The Patent Act sets the broad, outer bounds for
patentability and infringement, but the courts decide how those principles
apply.365 To do so, the courts have created and applied doctrines based on
their understanding of how patent policy should be implemented.366 But,
courts devise such doctrines piecemeal without full consideration of how to
properly balance patent rights versus innovation. Giving power to the courts
would be appropriate if the Patent Act was already clear about what eco358
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nomic and societal judgments courts should make in determining validity.367
But, the Patent Act is vague and has not been amended in over seventy-five
years, meaning that it predates the immense technological innovation that
has occurred since then, especially in the software and medical fields.368
Courts simply have no guidance or expertise to weigh the often competing
demands of encouraging innovation and protecting property rights.
Moreover, some scholars argue that patents should function differently
across different industries, with some industries benefiting from broader
benefits and others needing narrower ones to encourage innovation.369 Dan
L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley argue that courts already have the necessary
tools, in the form of what they call “patent levers,” to adjust patent scope
depending on the industry.370 But, the disparate nature of decision making—
combined with the CAFC’s failure to embrace its role as a patent policymaker as opposed to being solely an adjudicator—necessarily results in patent policy being left in disarray. Courts may have the tools at their disposal
to properly make patent policy, but the CAFC and the district courts quite
simply have not embraced their role in making the patent system work.
Other institutional actors are similarly ill-equipped to carry out policy.
Congress could legislate to ensure divergent standards depending on the
industry, but relying on a legislative solution in this circumstance is impractical and involves too much administrative cost and uncertainty.371 Technology changes too often for Congress to keep up with it.372 Additionally, most
of the inquiries needed to dictate rules are fact-specific, requiring case-bycase application.373 The problem of intense industry lobbying may also result in policy that better reflects special interest influence rather than sound
economic policy on what actions actually encourage innovation.374 Congress’s foray into legislating patent law—the Biotechnological Process Patents Act of 1995, which codifies “that biotechnological processes that use
or result in a novel and nonobvious product are always nonobvious”—
illustrates the role that special interests play in the process.375
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Rather than the CAFC or Congress setting forth rules for guiding validity, the USPTO could instead use its rulemaking power to make more
explicit how patent claims should be construed and how the results vary
depending upon technology.376 The USPTO has not exercised its limited
rulemaking power, thus relegating the power to decide many questions concerning patent laws to the courts.377 But, in order to understand whether an
invention should be patentable requires a thorough understanding of not
only the technology in question but also the economic markets involved to
properly resolve the balance between innovation and protection.378 Congress may also want to delegate to the agency the power to treat different
classes of subject matter differently, by, for instance, allowing patents on
software to last for shorter time periods than those on pharmaceutical products, which would address the different incentives in each industry regarding innovation.379 USPTO examiners with thousands of hours of experience
in surveying patents across a range of technologies would be most equipped
to decide whether a patent is valid or at least provide better guidance via
rulemaking on how claims in particular fields should be construed. Moreover, the USPTO is best equipped to keep up with modern technology and
the evolution of claim interpretation.
Reform of the system in an administrative fashion mirrors what many
other countries already do with respect to their patent jurisprudence. Rather
than rely on specialized judges, most of whom do not have scientific training, reallocation of the task—at least on validity determinations—could be
given to a federal agency. The courts would then be tasked with following
these rules and would instead focus their energy on adjudicating infringement disputes rather than worrying about construing claims or making invalidity determinations. The results of the present analysis indicate that most
mistakes concern either claim construction or validity determinations;
courts do a pretty good job in infringement analysis, so a proposal where
administrative agencies undertake more of the scientific analysis may be a
better path. Cohen et al., for instance, propose a Patent Litigation Review
Board that they argue would “discourage . . . weak patent infringement
suits[,] . . . strengthen the hands of patentees[,] . . . flag weaknesses [in the
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patent,] . . . and . . . provide policymakers with more . . . information” to
evaluate the patent system.380
Adaptation of rulemaking comes at the expense of judicial discretion
and flexibility.381 But, what are the benefits of flexibility in this current situation that could not otherwise be realized by the PTO? One concern is that
the time involved in rulemaking could necessitate delay in getting answers
in patent disputes. Such a concern is not trivial and the current system of
court action may give quicker answers, but those answers are not necessarily correct or consistent.
The administrative trend toward patent law reform has been set in motion by the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC.382 In this case, the Court held
that the inter partes review process undertaken by the USPTO is constitutional and does not violate either “Article III or the Seventh Amendment of
the Constitution.”383 In inter partes review, parties can contest the validity
of a patent, though there is not currently an administrative system where
parties could resolve disputes entirely at the PTAB rather than through the
courts.384 In other words, if parties have infringement issues, they must still
proceed through the court system, even though they could contest validity at
the PTAB instead of the courts.385 In total, as of February 2019, the PTAB
had received over 8,000 PTAB petitions challenging patent validity under
procedures instituted under the AIA.386 In the coming years, how the district
courts interact with this new system and whether parties choose to resolve
validity disputes at the PTAB instead of the district courts will impact how
the pilot program turns out. For instance, instead of filing before pilot judges, litigators may instead elect to file a petition before the PTAB. It is impossible to tell how much the inter partes process will cannibalize validity
decision making in the district courts.387 Some scholars have found that the
380
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majority of parties are substituting the PTAB process for district court litigation, at least when their claims concern validity.388 The Oil States decision
paves the way for altering the PTAB process to expand its reach.389 The
long-term viability of the pilot project may come down to how the program
intersects with that process.
In all, a fundamental rebalancing of the system to place decision making back in the hands of experts would do much to balance out the entire
system to get better results. As Arti K. Rai argues, “[i]f greater fact-finding
and policy application expertise were vested at the administrative and trial
court levels, the role of appellate review within the patent system could
substantially be reconceived.”390 The USPTO is already beginning to take
these steps. Although a full examination of the issue is beyond the scope of
this Article, inter partes review—where a third party can challenge the validity of a patent before the PTO—may be a mechanism that should be used
more frequently to gauge validity of patents in a consistent manner. This
study’s preliminary analysis of inter partes review reveals that many patents
are declared invalid before the PTO, yet district courts continue to find that
parties infringe them. Some courts even find the patents valid, contrary to
the PTO’s conclusion. The system needs to do better. A system where the
USPTO shapes, as much as possible, the validity determinations would create greater consistency and predictability in patent law decision making.391
CONCLUSION
The patent law system needs reform.392 Given the high volume of cases and the monetary stakes involved, the system is too unpredictable. Recent attempts to solve the problem by encouraging specialized expertise in
the patent system are a promising first step, but do not go far enough. Although the results in this study do not indicate that specialization translates
into more accurate decision making, the jury is still out for the final verdict,
as we need to give the pilot project more time for judges to adapt to the pilot. Moreover, by refocusing resources toward regional judges who hear
many patent cases, the program might achieve greater accuracy on appeal.
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The time is also ripe to ask whether radical alternatives are necessary; that
is, instead of adjudicating patent cases through the judicial system, engaging in a more vigorous debate about whether patent law should be drastically altered to give more power back to the administrative agency, which
could then leverage its technical expertise to properly resolve patent cases,
at least in part. Ultimately, the time has come for a discussion on whether a
nationally-based specialized trial court is a better alternative to the recent
patent pilot program.

